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The Efficient Production Of Law: The Political Economy of the Sources of Law.

机译:法律的有效生产:法律渊源的政治经济学。

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摘要

Law and economics scholarship has been predominantly concerned with the content of legal rules rather than the process by which rules are created. The analytical separation of law by its formative process has resulted in an almost exclusive focus on the allocative efficiency of legal entitlements. According to this view, legal rights are treated as "commodities" that people (absent transaction costs and wealth effects) can freely buy and sell, such that the rights are allocated to their highest valued use. In this thesis, I maintain that this conventional approach needs to be integrated with a complementary, process-oriented analysis, capable of accounting for the causal relationship between the efficiency of legal rules and the efficiency of the lawmaking process. The central hypothesis of the present research is that the efficiency of the law-making process is not neutral with respect to the efficiency of the rules: the more efficient the process is in dealing with the pervasive information and public choice problems inherent in the production of legal rules, the better the outcome will be from an efficiency standpoint. Once this logic is recognized, the problem of legal efficiency becomes one of identifying the comparative advantages and disadvantages of alternative sources of law. Based on these premises, this thesis has two ambitious purposes: (i) to develop a methodology for the analysis of alternative lawmaking institutions, based on the idea of "process efficiency" and a unified taxonomy of lawmaking costs, and (ii) to provide a comparative analysis of alternative lawmaking processes (i.e., politics, bureaucracy, adjudication and spontaneous lawmaking), with the purpose of identifying their relative advantages and disadvantages in various regulated environments. The ultimate goal is to advance the understanding of the relationship between lawmaking mechanisms and the efficiency properties of legal rules and, hence, to offer a more refined toolbox for identifying efficiency improvements in the organization of the sources of law.
机译:法律和经济学学者一直主要关注法律规则的内容,而不是规则创建的过程。通过法律的形成过程对法律进行分析性分离,导致几乎完全专注于法律权利的分配效率。根据这种观点,合法权利被视为人们(无交易成本和财富效应)可以自由买卖的“商品”,从而将权利分配给其最高价值的用途。在本文中,我坚持认为,这种常规方法需要与补充性的,面向过程的分析相结合,能够说明法律规则的效率与立法过程的效率之间的因果关系。本研究的中心假设是,立法过程的效率相对于规则的效率不是中立的:该过程越有效地处理生产过程中固有的普遍信息和公共选择问题。法律规则,从效率的角度来看,结果会更好。一旦认识到这种逻辑,法律效力问题就成为确定替代法律来源的相对优势和劣势之一。基于这些前提,本论文有两个雄心勃勃的目标:(i)基于“过程效率”的思想和立法成本的统一分类法,开发一种分析替代性立法机构的方法,以及(ii)提供对替代性立法程序(即政治,官僚,审判和自发立法)的比较分析,目的是确定其在各种规范环境中的相对优势和劣势。最终目标是加深对立法机制与法律规则效率属性之间关系的理解,从而提供更完善的工具箱,以识别法律来源组织中的效率改进。

著录项

  • 作者

    Bertolini, Daniele.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Toronto (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 University of Toronto (Canada).;
  • 学科 Law.;Political science.
  • 学位 S.J.D.
  • 年度 2014
  • 页码 638 p.
  • 总页数 638
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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