This dissertation project asks the fundamental question "are there behavioral consequences of territorial threat?" Extant theory suggests that state behavioral responses to threat vary according to stakes. In particular, it seems that threat to territory is different than other sources of disputes. Because of the salience of territorial stakes, states are more likely to adopt aggressive, military-oriented foreign policy practices when faced with perceived or real threat to territory. Collectively, such strategies are referred to as realpolitik (or power politics, often defined as the use of arms races, alliances, and bellicose rhetoric) and are believed to account, at least in part, for the propensity of territorial stakes to escalate to war. In short, realpolitik foreign policy practices are a behavioral consequence of territorial threat and act as intervening variables between territorial competition and escalation to war. Thus far, however, the assertion that realpolitik is more common in this context is assumed, rather than tested. In this dissertation, I propose a theory that attempts to link territorial competition to realpolitik behavior. Empirical analyses confirm that territorial competition increases the risk of rivalry formation and rivalry severity, as well as the likelihood that states will engage in arms buildups. No correlation is found between territorial threat and alliance behavior.
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