RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1960.

摘要

This study deals with the relationship of nationalism, national paths to socialism, and internationalist loyalties in the theory and practice of these two parties. The Yugoslav Communists were able to identify themselves with a nationalist program early on. Encouraged by the fact that they were part of a unitary national front, in autumn 1942 they had already given demands for Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, and parts of the Eastern Friuli a key place in their statements of war aims. The Italian Communists, working within a national front in which parties were represented as parties, could not identify themselves with a nationalist program. They argued that discussion of territorial questions was best put off until war's end. This difference led to considerable conflict between the parties, a situation complicated in late 1944, when, following military reverses and organizational disruption, Italian Communist partisian formations and party organizations along the Italo-Yugoslav frontier accepted operational subordination to their Yugoslav counterparts.Success in the struggle with the Cominform, and the ideological innovation which the conflict generated, strengthened the distinctiveness of Yugoslav Communism and its identification with the nation. The Italian party, in particular General Secretary Palmiro Togliatti, was generally unenthusiastic about participation in the anti-Yugoslav campaign and tried to avoid too close an identification with the Cominform. But the period from 1948 to 1954 was a very difficult one for the Italian Communists and saw several steps backward in their development as a genuinely national force.During de-Stalinization, the Italians were quick to re-establish relations with their Yugoslav counterparts. They referred to the Yugoslav case as a crucial example of the possibilities of a genuinely national communism. At the same time, they continued to identify with the Soviet camp, never breaking completely and overtly with Soviet positions during 1954-1960. Still, the role of the most staunchly pro-Soviet and rigidly Stalinist party leaders was being reduced, with positive implications for relations with the Yugoslav party. Fluctuations in Soviet attitudes did little to influence the Yugoslav leadership, secure in their position at the head of the nation. They found it in their interest to cultivate good relations with the Italian and Polish parties, which showed a marked concern with national autonomy and were, like the Yugoslavs, on the right end of the Communist spectrum.During the early postwar years, the Italian Communists were unable to convince the Yugoslavs to moderate their territorial demands, though this could have benefited the former by easing the climate of nationalistic tension within Italy. The success of socialist construction in Yugoslavia stood in marked contrast to the expulsion of the Communists from the governing coalition in Italy. The conjunction of a precarious internal situation and accumulated grievances against the Yugoslav party helped predispose the Italians to accept the Cominform Resolution of June 1948.