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THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES TO LIFE-SAVING PROGRAMS, WITH AN APPENDIX ON THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE.

机译:将稀缺资源分配给拯救生命的计划,并附上关于人类生命的经济价值的附录。

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摘要

Legislators, and public officials in general, have often been criticized by economists for not equalizing the marginal costs of the different government-controlled "life-saving" programs. Although these economists have not provided formal models to support their criticisms, they assume that an equalization of the so-called "implicit values per life saved" is a necessary condition for efficiency in the allocation of public resources. In this dissertation, we develop a very simple general equilibrium model that is consistent with the "willingness to pay" approach to life valuation. This model is subsequently used to prove that the above recommendation can only be sustained under rather unrealistic assumptions on the individuals' preferences regarding death and dying; when one brings more realistic assumptions on the individuals' preferences into the analysis, the reasons favoring equality in marginal costs seem to vanish. Under these circumstances, we argue, an eventual equalization of marginal costs would entail a cost in terms of social welfare. An estimator for that cost is provided.;Finally, in an appendix we discuss in detail several of the major problems that arise when one tries to estimate the economic value of human life. In particular, we explain the relationship between the "willingness to pay" and the "human capital" methods of valuation.;Lawmakers often issue regulatory legislation setting maximum acceptable levels of risk to life for a number of economic activities, thereby setting minimum values for the expenditures required on the corresponding life-saving programs. We prove that in such cases, "efficiency" considerations do not require us to introduce any change in the optimal structure of the relative marginal costs of unregulated life-saving activities. Nevertheless, these same "efficiency" considerations may require us to set the expenditure levels of the programs affected by "political minima" well above the levels required by the legislators.
机译:经济学家经常批评立法者和一般公职人员没有使政府控制的不同“拯救生命”计划的边际成本均等。尽管这些经济学家没有提供正式的模型来支持他们的批评,但他们认为,所谓的“所挽救的生命隐含价值”的均衡是有效分配公共资源的必要条件。在本文中,我们建立了一个非常简单的一般均衡模型,该模型与“支付意愿”方法进行人寿评估是一致的。该模型随后被用来证明上述建议只能在个人关于死亡和死亡偏好的相当不现实的假设下得以维持;当人们将关于个人偏好的更现实的假设纳入分析时,支持边际成本均等的理由似乎消失了。我们认为,在这种情况下,最终的边际成本均等化将带来社会福利方面的成本。最后,在附录中,我们详细讨论了当人们试图估计人类生命的经济价值时出现的几个主要问题。特别是,我们解释了“支付意愿”和“人力资本”评估方法之间的关系。立法者经常发布法规,为许多经济活动设定最大的生命风险可接受水平,从而为经济活动设定最小值。相应的救生计划所需的支出。我们证明,在这种情况下,“效率”方面的考虑并不要求我们对不受管制的救生活动的相对边际成本的最佳结构进行任何更改。但是,出于同样的“效率”考虑,我们可能需要将受“政治最低要求”影响的计划的支出水平设定为远高于立法者要求的水平。

著录项

  • 作者

    COMAS, XAVIER.;

  • 作者单位

    The Johns Hopkins University.;

  • 授予单位 The Johns Hopkins University.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1984
  • 页码 156 p.
  • 总页数 156
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:51:21

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