Labor contracting in California agriculture.

摘要

This dissertation analyzes farm labor contracting in California agriculture in relation to the role played by contractors in maintaining a cheap labor supply and strengthening management control over the labor process. A formal model is developed in which the relative efficiencies of labor contractors and growers in extracting work from workers, seasonality, skill level and output sensitivity to quality and quantity supervision determine the grower's choice of employment contract. Derived reduced form equations are estimated which specify the wages and probability of contractor employment as functions of worker and job characteristics.; Whereas growers possess an advantage in supervising work quality and the use of wage incentives to monitor work intensity, labor contractors are more efficient at recruiting workers with a lower average opportunity wage. Econometric results show that labor contracting dominates in short season tasks that are relatively simple and repetitive, and where speed rather than work quality has a greater effect on output, such as in hoeing row crops and harvesting vegetables. In contrast, direct hiring is shown to dominate in long season tasks such as irrigating, where output is more sensitive to work quality.; Associated with each activity and contract type is an optimal level of recruitment expenditure, defining the pool from which workers are hired. Illegal immigration status is shown to increase the probability of contractor employment, whereas union membership and years of farm work experience decrease this probability. Wages are shown to be lower under contracting, net the effects of worker and job characteristics, because under contracting both wage flexibility and the threat of unionization are reduced. Simulation results show that employer sanctions which increase growers' costs of recruitnent, and state policies which weaken union influence will lead to greater reliance on the contracting system and lower expected wages. Use of labor contracting to restrict formation of worker coalitions that threaten management control is demonstrated historically and in the context of increasing demand for contract labor in the Salinas Valley.