The National Agricultural Bargaining Act of 1979: American agriculture's continuing pursuit of countervailing power.

摘要

The National Agricultural Bargaining Act of 1979 aimed to establish "good faith" bargaining between accredited producer associations (farmers) and agricultural products' processors. This seemingly misplaced attempt to transplant a device of organized labor to the farmer is actually the contemporary manifestation of American agriculture's longterm attempt to obtain what Galbraith calls "countervailing power." Most evident with the agrarian movements' massed numbers and battle cries of "producer power," countervailing power has been organized agriculture's fundamental goal even when only implicitly pursued by the general farm organizations through the commodity programs.;Seeking to reconcile the national legislative effort's failure with the practice's viability, the dissertation analyzes American politics at its most elemental level--the interest group and policy--over an extended period. Simultaneously, it offers the political scientist an opportunity to analyze the effect that American agriculture's changing economic and political standing is having on interest group maintenance and policy formation in this sector. The method of examination is a case study making heavy use of primary sources obtained through extensive interviews and the unpublished file material of individuals who participated in the legislation's life. Secondary sources from the Library of Congress and Cornell's agricultural collection were also used.;The conclusion this dissertation reaches is that a policy's supporters and goals are the key variables and predictors in legislation's fate. In this policy's case, while agriculture's organized forces have pursued countervailing power throughout their existence, they have done so for ever decreasing portions of American agriculture. Because the drive for national bargaining legislation represents the vanguard of agriculture's changing market structure, it not only failed to escape this trend but intensified it. Until the proponents can circumvent the general trend and this legislation's inherent tendencies, the practice will remain limited.;Not until the agricultural market's changing conditions gave rise to bargaining did this goal become explicit again. Despite the practice's resiliency due to its convergence with agriculture's economic trends and its legislative successes at the state and national level, the effort to combine de facto national enabling legislation to its de jure rights failed and has not reappeared.