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DEBIASING AUDIT JUDGMENT WITH ACCOUNTABILITY: A FRAMEWORK AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS.

机译:负有责任的审计判断辩论:一项框架和实验结果。

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摘要

This research examines the effect of accountability, defined as the requirement to justify one's judgments to others, on two judgment biases--recency and the curse of knowledge. Audit judgment research documents the presence of each of these biases in the absence of accountability. However, accountability is an important element of the auditing environment, and research in psychology shows that accountability motivates cognitive effort. An important question is whether the additional cognitive effort induced by accountability is sufficient to overcome auditors' information processing biases.; I propose the following causal framework for predicting the effectiveness of accountability in mitigating judgment biases. Strategic biases are the result of conscious cost/benefit tradeoffs between cognitive effort and benefits such as accuracy, the speed of decision-making, and the decision's justifiability. Accountability alters the benefits associated with cognitive effort such that strategic biases may be eliminated or markedly reduced. In contrast, data-related biases are caused by the way internal or external data is used by the decision maker rather than insufficient attention or effort. Since accountability does not alter the decision maker's knowledge, memory, or information set, accountability is unlikely to prevent or mitigate data-related biases. Experiments testing the predictions of this framework--accountability's effectiveness with recency (a strategic bias) and ineffectiveness with the curse of knowledge (a data-related bias)--provide support. Recency was eliminated by accountability when tested with MBA students and did not exist among professional auditors. I conjecture that the lack of recency among auditors is due to carryover effects from their accountability-inducing environment. The curse of knowledge was not mitigated by accountability, whether the subjects were MBA students or auditors.
机译:这项研究研究了问责制的作用,定义为将一个人的判断与他人进行辩解的要求,这对两个判断性偏见-新近度和知识的诅咒。审计判断研究记录了在没有问责制的情况下每种偏见的存在。但是,问责制是审计环境的重要组成部分,心理学研究表明,问责制可以激发认知努力。一个重要的问题是由问责制引起的额外认知努力是否足以克服审计师的信息处理偏见。我提出以下因果框架来预测问责制在减轻判断偏差方面的有效性。战略偏见是认知努力与收益(例如准确性,决策速度和决策合理性)之间有意识的成本/收益权衡的结果。问责制改变了与认知努力相关的收益,从而可以消除或显着减少战略偏见。相反,与数据相关的偏差是由决策者使用内部或外部数据的方式而不是没有足够的注意力或精力引起的。由于问责制不会改变决策者的知识,内存或信息集,因此问责制不太可能阻止或减轻与数据相关的偏见。实验测试了此框架的预测-责任与有效性的新近度(战略性偏见)和无效与知识的诅咒(与数据相关的偏见)-提供了支持。在与MBA学生进行测试时,新近度被问责制消除了,在专业审核员中并不存在。我猜想,审计师缺乏新近性是由于他们的问责制环境带来的结转影响。问责制并不能减轻知识的诅咒,无论这些科目是MBA学生还是审计师。

著录项

  • 作者

    KENNEDY, SUSAN JANE.;

  • 作者单位

    DUKE UNIVERSITY.;

  • 授予单位 DUKE UNIVERSITY.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.
  • 学位 PH.D.
  • 年度 1992
  • 页码 155 p.
  • 总页数 155
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;
  • 关键词

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