Impact of industrial relations strategies on selected human resource practices in a partially unionized industry: The Canadian petroleum sector.

摘要

An inductive, multi-method approach is applied to assess the concept of strategic choice in industrial relations. The causes of inter-firm variability in selected human resource practices and policies of the Canadian petroleum industry are explored, with a focus on hourly workers in gas plants. The petroleum industry is a significant research site because it has a low union penetration rate and contains a variety of nonunion employee representation plans.;Data sources include interviews with managers and union officials, archival materials, wages and working conditions surveys and collective agreement provisions, case studies of matched union and nonunion plants, and a survey of managers. An institutional history of the industry is provided.;The industry operates with a tight wage contour and is a wage leader. The industry's long-term lack of inter-firm variability in wages was evident prior to concerted union organizing drives. Two factors help explain these phenomena. First, companies use high wages to eliminate any economic incentive for workers to unionize. Second, a strong norm of imitation characterizes this industry.;On nonremunerative practices, there are significant differences among firms. In particular, union security clauses, the introduction of new forms of work design, and employee-management communication vary greatly. There is sufficient evidence of spillover of management practices from the United States by a cluster of American-owned firms to support the need for further research on trans-border effects.;Strong indicators of management strategy are (1) a wage premium to nonunion employees; (2) refusal to collect union dues for the entire bargaining unit; and (3) nonunion employee representation schemes aimed at reducing union-propensity. It is suggested that companies which are using nonunion employee representation schemes perhaps are operating under an illusion that they require less time and effort than union sites.;Nine propositions are developed to explain inter-firm variability. The utility of the existing schema of union avoidance, acceptance, and substitution is challenged. Instead, a matrix is developed in which firms can be classified as (I) Enacting/Pattern-Avoiding; (II) Interacting/Pattern-Setting; (III) Reacting/Pattern-Following; and (IV) Wavering/Pattern-Copying.