Holding options in a theory of search.

摘要

This dissertation has two parts. Chapter I and Chapter II examines the effects of a holding option in a search and matching context. Chapter III investigates the firms' R&D behavior with focus on the post-innovation competition in licensing.; In search theory, the agents' incentive to have/offer the ability to recall has been ignored. A holding option allowing the searcher to have the ability to recall is introduced in a search and matching context. Chapter I considers one agent search problem. In the finite horizon search problem, the searcher's incentive to have a holding option increases as the last period comes closer. However, in the infinite horizon search problem, the searcher never uses the holding option. These results show that the searcher's incentive to have a holding option arises from the decreasing opportunity to search.; Chapter II considers a search and matching model with a Poisson matching process. Two potential matches are considered, good match and bad match. The holding option has two opposite effects on market efficiency: It increases total search cost by encouraging the searchers to continue search, while it saves the search cost of the searchers with a bad match on hold. Depending on the population size, the holding option can worsen or improve market efficiency. The existence of a holding option can be an equilibrium in a game where the agents can decide whether or not to offer the option.; Chapter III examines the post-innovation competition in licensing and its effect on the firms' R&D behavior. I present the historical cases involving the firms' exclusive cross-licensing when there is more than one innovator in the market and present a model that explains those cases. The model explains how the competition in licensing may reduce the innovator's profit to the level less than the profit without licensing. I also examine the potential patentees' incentive to avoid the competition in R&D by forming a research joint venture or by making a license contract between the patentee-incumbent and the potential entrant. This analysis establishes a socially harmful use of the research joint venture and the patent right.