The political economy of economic policy reform in Colombia: Technocratic bureaucracy and business-government relations, 1966-1992.

摘要

The dissertation is a theoretically-informed study of economic policy reform in Colombia. The country has long been characterized by stable macroeconomic policy management, low inflation, and prudent debt service. Since the late 1960s, government officials have carried out significant economic reforms with lower political costs than elsewhere in the region. As such, the case provides us with a valuable example of how states shift development strategies and implement policy reforms in the context of a developing democracy.; The study highlights the interplay of institutions, interests, and ideas in explaining two significant policy shifts: (1) a reorientation of trade and development policy after 1967; and (2) the switch to an export-led growth strategy in 1990. Unlike some interpretations of the earlier reform that emphasize "market forces," it argues that Colombia's development strategy more closely resembles the East Asian experience, as import substitution was complemented with export promotion, and stable macroeconomic management was enhanced by the creation of a competent technocratic bureaucracy. Institutional factors--i.e., regime type, the political party system, and the structure of economic decision-making--are crucial for explaining the character and direction in both policy reforms. Both reforms were initiated largely by state or bureaucratic interests, and only the more recent policy switch involved significant societal pressure, especially from new export-oriented business groups. The role of ideas is seen as an important, but by no means sufficient, variable in both policy reforms. This includes an early emphasis on planning reform, and more recently, important changes within Colombia's economics profession as free-market economists came to dominate the most important policy positions after 1986.; The findings show that governments can increase state capacity for economic management through reforms that concentrate expertise in bureaucratic agencies insulated from outside pressures for patronage. But this often requires limiting access to the policy process and isolating policy makers from societal pressures, factors that can jeopardize long-term prospects for democratic development. To the extent that economic adjustment is carried out with a broad-based consensus and close consultation with private sector groups, there appears to be a greater chance of sustaining those reforms.