Environmentalism without illusions: Redefining the roles of philosophy and ecology.

摘要

To express concern for our "relationship" with our environment is immediately to raise the questions of what our environment is and what sort of relationship we do--or ought to--have with it. While environmental thinkers frequently make broad factual and normative claims about our environment, I argue that these claims are usually based on a profound misunderstanding of the scope and limits of human knowledge; specifically, they overlook the ambiguity of our knowledge of our environment in favor of the apparent certainty of speculative philosophy. I take as an important symptom of this the pronounced ambivalence of environmental thinkers toward the sciences, in consequence of which environmental thought cannot adequately integrate detailed, scientific knowledge of the material relationships that constitute our environment and bind us to it.;Drawing from sources in the history of philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, I re-evaluate the conceptual and theoretical bases of environmental thought, assess the possibilities and limits of our knowledge of material relationships as studied by ecology and the other environmental sciences, and discuss relevance of that knowledge for practical decision-making. James Lovelock's "Gaia" hypothesis serves as the key example throughout.;Finally, I establish that an emphasis on scientific knowledge, properly understood, results in a radical revision of the meaning and the prospects of environmental thought. I identify three aspects of this revision: from theories of "relatedness" to an appropriate attention to material, particularly biological, relationships; from "biocentrism" to a newly constituted "anthropocentrism"; and from intellectualism to a more broadly based "environmental pragmatics," in which philosophy and the sciences each play a vital though narrowly circumscribed role.