Military factors and conventional arms control: The impact of military technology and military doctrine upon conventional military offensiveness and arms control.

摘要

The focus of this dissertation is upon the military preconditions and the military outcomes of conventional arms control.;The evidence surveyed in this dissertation suggests that the common wisdom is flawed. Imbalances in technology, manpower and weapons cannot be shown to systematically produce the incentives for conventional offensive actions. These imbalances, consequently, seem to be poor targets for structural arms control. The failure of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (1932-37) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe Talks (1973-89) may be argued as evidence that a structural approach to conventional arms control is inherently unsatisfactory.;Conversely, many of the major conventional confrontations of the twentieth century may be argued to have begun and have been decided by an asymmetry of offensiveness in conventional military doctrines. Military doctrines are largely intangible, and therefore defy circumscription with structural arms control. The "control" of military doctrine is best approximated by the earliest possible knowledge of potential adversary offensive capabilities. This, in turn, can only come through robust and reciprocal transparency rights to observe the military doctrine of one's arms control partners.;These deductions suggest that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) of 1990 succeeded where previous conventional arms control talks failed more because of its transparency and openness effects than for its structural limitations upon military equipment. A holistic assessment of the CFE Treaty as part of an expanding regime of military-to-military transparency in Europe best understands the promise and the limitations of conventional arms control.;Common wisdom has it that conventional arms control best achieves meaningful military outcomes when producing structural results: those which limit or reduce the instruments of war--men, material and equipment. The pursuit of structural arms control, in turn, originates from the belief that it is an imbalance of men, material or technology between adversaries which encourages conventional military aggression.;A sustainable approach to conventional arms control must feature a robust appreciation of the manner in which the intangible military factors of doctrine, logistics and exercises interact to produce the asymmetries which fuel conventional military offensiveness. To be sustainable, therefore, conventional arms control most first establish the principles of openness and transparency between potential military adversaries, only then turning its attention to traditionally favored structural and operational constraint of forces and weapons.