Kantian moral theory is firmly established in contemporary ethics, yet Kant's Metaphysics of Morals must still count as a neglected book. This dissertation focuses on the first part of this work, the "Doctrine of Right" (Rechtslehre). It gives an account of the basic structure and fundamental principles of Kant's theory of right; it scrutinizes a recurrent set of previously unanalyzed distinctions and concepts of his legal theory; finally, it looks closely at how Kant conceives of the application of his theory to particular cases.; Most interpretations of Kant's theory of right have failed to account for its fundamental structure by giving too much weight to his theory of constitutional and international law and discounting his conception of private law. I show that the "Universal Principle of Right" is importantly qualified by the "Juridical Postulate," which is the core element of Kant's theory of private law. Most scholars fail to analyze many of the concepts and distinctions that preoccupy Kant in his thinking about the law. These include the difference between strict right and equity; the idea of rights against oneself; proportionality and necessity; the notion of permissive laws; the role of different types of rights (claims, privileges, immunities, powers), different types of rules (conduct rules and decision rules), and different types of exceptions (justifications and excuses). In highlighting the significance of these concepts and distinctions I draw on contemporary legal scholarship (Fletcher, Atiyah), analytical jurisprudence (Hohfeld, Raz), and analytical ethics (J. Thomson). The application of principles is a notoriously difficult and controversial issue in Kantian moral theory. Looking at how Kant addresses certain cases in his theory of right, one can see how the application of the categorical imperative is structured and guided by those concepts and distinctions. What emerges eventually is a rather unfamiliar image of Kant's moral and legal thought.
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