This is a study of the secret diplomacy between the United States and North Vietnam to arrive at a political settlement of the Second Indochina War. It explores the making of diplomatic policy during the conflict, and relates in detail the proceedings of the private peace talks between representatives of Washington and Hanoi in the period 1968-1973. Through an assessment of the conditions in South and North Vietnam and the United States, this study describes how diplomatic activity came to be the most effective means for Hanoi and Washington to end the war on terms both parties found acceptable. In doing so, the study also shows how and why the two governments eventually lost faith in military victory.; This study is ground-breaking on account of its multi-archival scope. It is the first history of North Vietnamese-American relations to be based on primary documentation acquired from depositories in both Vietnam and the United States. The description of secret negotiating sessions is particularly incisive given that it comes mostly from the actual memoranda of conversations between North Vietnamese and American delegates in Paris. To clarify developments that remained obscure, materials from the Canadian archives were used. As a member on two neutral supervisory commissions for Indochina between 1954 and 1973, Canada monitored closely the situation in Vietnam, and maintained contact with every party directly involved in the hostilities. Its archives, therefore, abound with revealing data.; Beyond offering conclusive answers to questions relating to policy-making and policy-implementation, the study challenges several commonly accepted postulates concerning the secret negotiations and the war in general. It also stresses the important role played by the South Vietnamese government in the diplomatic process, and provides unparalleled insight into North Vietnam's domestic conditions and the Party's efforts at building socialism there during the conflict.
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