Decision costs, government strength, and political-economic outcomes in industrial democracies, 1960-1990

摘要

This dissertation examines the trade-offs inherent in democratic institutional design, I argue that more exclusive or strong institutional settings (such as those with single-party, unitary government) reduce decision-making costs and rent-seeking, but as a consequence have higher costs of exclusion. Conversely, more inclusive or weak systems (typified by coalitions and federalism) have lower costs of exclusion but incur greater decision-making costs and rent seeking. Examining industrial democracies from 1960 to 1990, I find that weak, consensus-based systems have higher overall government outlays, devote more expenditures to social expenditures, and have greater increases in public-sector employment than strong, majoritarian systems. Moreover, weak/consensus systems have higher levels of taxes to fund these programs. These findings call into question the conclusions of other scholars who proclaim weak/consensus systems superior to strong/majoritarian systems and indicate that there are costs incurred with inclusion.