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Multi-person cooperative games: The nucleoli approach and assignment games.

机译:多人合作游戏:核仁方法和任务博弈。

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摘要

Existence and uniqueness have been major concerns for many solution concepts in multi-person cooperative game theory. The nucleolus, however, is among those which do not exist and is unique for each partition structure in any game. It has been investigated throughout the literature, particularly with respect to the grand coalition where the nucleolus provides a unique outcome. Yet surprisingly little has been written about the nucleoli for possible partition structures other than the grand coalition.;In this dissertation, the nucleoli for possible partition structures in all three-person games (as well as other classes of multi-person cooperative games) are investigated. A proof is given which demonstrates that, whenever the core is the empty set, the nucleolus for the grand coalition is dominated by the nucleoli for other partition structures. Also introduced is a new solution concept--itself a modification of the classical nucleolus--which enforces full cooperation among participants. Algebraic formulas to compute the nucleoli and the modified nucleolus are then presented.;In the second part of this dissertation, properties of the core, the bargaining simplex, and the nucleolus for the Shapley-Shubik assignment games are investigated. The bargaining simplex for such games is a line segment which is expressed in terms of a real parameter. For those assignment games where the core contains the bargaining simplex, the nucleolus for the grand coalition is the midpoint of the bargaining simplex. The idea of the bargaining simplex extends to include the class of multisided assignment games where there are m sets of players, each of different types.;Several algorithms already exist for computing the nucleolus of games in general, as well as for the Shapley-Shubik assignment games in particular, e.g., by Solymosi and Raghavan (1994). The approach presented in this dissertation circumvent the otherwise use of linear programming (and/or balanced sets) frequently employed by these algorithms.
机译:存在性和唯一性已成为多人合作博弈理论中许多解决方案概念的主要问题。然而,核仁是不存在的核仁,对于任何游戏中的每个分区结构都是唯一的。整个文献都对此进行了研究,特别是在核仁提供独特成果的大联盟方面。然而,令人惊讶的是,除了大联盟以外,几乎没有关于可能的分区结构的核子的文章。本论文中,所有三人游戏(以及其他类别的多人合作游戏)中可能的分区结构的核子都是调查。给出的证明表明,每当核心是空集时,大联盟的核仁就由其他分区结构的核仁支配。还介绍了一个新的解决方案概念,它本身就是对经典核仁的改良,可以加强参与者之间的全面合作。然后给出了计算核仁和修饰核仁的代数公式。在本论文的第二部分,研究了Shapley-Shubik分配博弈的核心,讨价还价单纯形和核仁的性质。这样的游戏的讨价还价单纯形是线段,该线段以实参数表示。对于核心包含讨价还价单纯形的赋值游戏,大联盟的核仁就是讨价还价单纯形的中点。讨价还价单纯形的想法扩展到包括多边赋值游戏的类别,其中有m套玩家,每种类型各不相同;;已经有几种算法可以用来计算游戏的总体核素,以及Shapley-Shubik特别是任务游戏,例如Solymosi和Raghavan(1994)。本文提出的方法避免了这些算法经常采用的线性规划(和/或平衡集)的使用。

著录项

  • 作者

    Hamza, Hamza Abidali.;

  • 作者单位

    The Claremont Graduate University.;

  • 授予单位 The Claremont Graduate University.;
  • 学科 Mathematics.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1997
  • 页码 104 p.
  • 总页数 104
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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