This dissertation addresses the issue of the status of transcendent being as conceived in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. It is my contention that neither thinker has dealt with this issue in a wholly adequate and unambiguous manner. According to the orthodox interpretation, either the claim is made that the problem falls outside the scope of phenomenological inquiry since (with Husserl) transcendence has undergone "phenomenological reduction" thus shifting our philosophical focus to that of "mere phenomena" or "sense," or (with Heidegger) talk of "transcendent reality" is indicative of a "derivative" understanding of being (Vorhandensein) which fails to encounter being in a more ontologically original way. Yet, both Husserl and Heidegger interpret their projects as providing the ultimate horizon wherein all genuine philosophical questions can be meaningfully articulated. This study maintains that the problem of transcendent being is in fact a legitimate philosophic concern and that therefore it is incumbent that phenomenology neither neglect nor minimize this problem but directly come to terms with it. Through an analysis of key Husserlian and Heideggerian notions, I argue that while their critique of a metaphysics of transcendent being successfully undermines modern scientific realism, it nevertheless leaves the misleading impression that phenomenology no longer concerns itself with transcendent being as such. Against this view, I show that both Husserl's and Heidegger's thought implicitly moves in the direction of a phenomenologically redeemed conception of transcendent being. In Husserl, I locate the transcendent in the notion of the "pre-existing life-world". In Heidegger, I locate the transcendent in the notion of existentia which Heidegger (despite himself) must tacitly presuppose for the sake of his ontology. Thus, I argue that a reassessment of the two thinkers along lines which situate them closer to traditional metaphysics is in order.
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