This dissertation analyzes international economic dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") and before investment arbitration tribunals. It focuses on case-law, particularly certain "hard" cases that juxtapose the authority of an international tribunal with the generally-accepted freedom of action of national governments. It is divided into three papers, the first of which deals with the WTO specifically, and ends with a study of the Generalized System of Preferences case. The second focuses on international investment arbitration, principally at ICSID, and specifically the contentious claim of indirect expropriation, along with concomitant questions of jurisdiction and applicable law. It ends with an analysis of the CME and Lauder arbitrations. The third paper deals with the notion of estoppel in international law, as applied at the WTO and in investment arbitration, and analyzes it both as a concept of international law per se, and as an indicator of the tension between national decision-making and international limitations. The dissertation concludes generally that while WTO dispute resolution has been the focus of much criticism, it has overall pursued a more consistent and traditionally acceptable line in international law than would appear at first blush. Investment arbitration tribunals, however, appear to have escaped both the criticism and the consistency demanded of them in such a sensitive area of international law. The cases analyzed shed some light on, and raise many questions as to, the viability and usefulness of notions such as sovereignty in international law, and focus attention on the shift in the locus of authority from national governments to international bodies.
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