A personalist defense of a libertarian account of free will.

摘要

This is a defense of a libertarian account of free will from a theistic personalist perspective. The overall argument is in two parts, which is set forth in three chapters. The first part disputes the ability of compatibilism to reconcile to objective moral responsibility. It aims to expose the weakness of compatibilism, the rival theory to libertarianism. The interconnectedness of freedom, causality, and moral responsibility points to the importance of defending the libertarian view. Compatibilism is then critiqued on its subjective location of moral responsibility. Such a view is set in contrast with the objective responsibility commonly understood in Christian theism.;The second part of the overall argument is further divided into two subparts. First, the problem of causation in libertarianism is posed. To be a viable position, libertarianism has to account for how a free act is caused to occur. Agent-causation is introduced in contrast to event-causation. This subpart focuses on the assumptions of these two kinds of causation and how they can be analyzed. The conclusion is that both have their limits in giving reasons for the happening of any event or action. Thus, the mysteriousness of agent-causation is not any worse than that of event-causation, which is not questioned by the compatibilists.;Second, the uneasiness among philosophers caused by the notion of "mystery" in agent-causation is approached from the personalist perspective, which is assumed or adopted by many theologians. The personalist understands the person as agent. Such a perspective gives a broader metaphysical context in which personhood is the ground for all other rational understandings. The conclusion, then, is that while personalism does not solve the mystery of personhood or free agency, it does clarify and pinpoint the limitations of our ability to understand human action and rationality.;The conclusion drawn from this project is that a libertarian understanding of free will is the most fitting to a theistic system. The personalist perspective implicitly or explicitly held by many theists not only is consistent with such an account but also illuminates the mysteriousness revolving around the causal understanding of free will. Finally, the conclusion also points to some of the possible ramifications these results might bring to theology. How they can be applied will be open to further studies.