The Mexican Chamber of Deputies is the depositary of the constitutional authority to oversee and balance the executive branch of government. However, evidence shows a gap between the written norm and the actual behavior observed. Over most of the 1970--1998 period, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies has not exerted an effective oversight of government's actions. Two case studies are analyzed: the supervision of public finances and the oversight of public enterprises carried out by Investigation Committees.;In Mexico, research performed on legislative studies is scant and mostly descriptive and non-analytical. Its usefulness to understanding the politics of congressional behavior is therefore limited. In contrast, American scholars have developed an ample body of research to explain congressional oversight. This study attempts to take some ideas from U.S. studies to understand legislative oversight in Mexico.;The variables found to be relevant in explaining the lack of an effective system of legislative control, refer to the motivations shaping deputies' behavior. As consecutive re-election is forbidden, Mexican legislators have to seek promotion to other offices once their term expires. In Mexico, the chief executive has ample powers to select candidacies to most elected offices by his party (the PRI), and therefore, deputies respond to that incentive by pleasing and lobbying the president, who in practice, has become the principal source of support for advancing the political careers of PRI lawmakers. In consequence, the direction of accountability is reversed, from constituencies---which matter little as they cannot reward their representatives due to the clause banning consecutive re-election, to the chief executive---who enjoys ample powers to promote political careers.;As the PRI held a majority of the Chamber seats until 1997, this pattern of reversed-accountability constrained the incentives of the PRI members to carry out oversight activities of the executive branch. As the opposition has grown in strength, to the point of becoming the Chamber's majority in 1997, so have the incentives for more legislative oversight. Today, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies is exerting more oversight activities, though its effectiveness continues to be limited by a lack of resources and experience by members of Congress.
展开▼
