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External finance and the signaling potential of dividends: Evidence from a developing country.

机译:外部资金和红利的潜在信号:来自发展中国家的证据。

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摘要

Manufacturing firms in India rely heavily on external funds, yet they continue to pay dividends. Although this behavior contradicts the standard financial hierarchy hypothesis, it is consistent with a signaling motive for paying dividends. I investigate the signaling explanation by examining whether dividend behavior differs among groups of Indian firms with heterogeneous access to external funds and by examining the determinants of Indian firms' dividend decisions. Using a panel of firm-level data, I divide my sample into two groups: small firms, which rely almost exclusively on loans for external funds, and large firms, which obtain forty percent of their external funds through debentures and equity capital. My results indicate that small firms pay dividends less frequently than large firms and that their dividend payments are relatively smaller and less stable. In addition, I divide my sample of large firms into two groups based on firms' ability to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Large firms that are hypothesized to have better access to external funds receive a larger percentage of these funds through debentures, pay out a larger portion of earnings, and exhibit more stability in dividend payments. The observed differences in dividend policy may be associated with large firms using dividends to signal their future earnings to potential providers of external funds.;To examine the determinants of Indian firms' dividend decisions, I estimate the Lintner dividend model as well as alternative models that assume dividends are based on expected future earnings and compare the ability of the models to explain dividend behavior. As an additional test, I compare various accounting measures of the earnings variable. The evidence for my large firms, including those firms that are generally believed to be able to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information, is consistent with the notion that large firms in India pay dividends as a signal of future earnings. Such evidence does not exist for my small firms.
机译:印度的制造公司严重依赖外部资金,但它们仍在支付股息。尽管此行为与标准的财务层次结构假设相矛盾,但与支付股息的信号动机一致。我通过检查在具有外部资金异质访问方式的印度公司组之间的股息行为是否不同,以及通过检查印度公司股息决策的决定因素,来研究信号解释。通过使用一组公司级数据,我将样本分为两类:几乎完全依赖外部资金贷款的小型公司,以及通过债券和股本资本获得其外部资金40%的大型公司。我的结果表明,与大公司相比,小公司支付股息的频率更低,并且其股息支付相对较小且不稳定。此外,我根据企业减轻非对称信息影响的能力将大企业样本分为两组。假定能够更好地利用外部资金的大公司通过债权证获得了这些资金的更大比例,支付了更大的收益,并且股息支付表现出更大的稳定性。观察到的股息政策差异可能与大公司利用股息向潜在的外部资金提供者发出未来收益信号有关。为了检查印度公司股息决策的决定因素,我估计了Lintner股息模型以及其他模型假设股息基于预期的未来收益,并比较模型解释股息行为的能力。作为一项附加测试,我比较了收入变量的各种会计指标。我的大公司(包括那些通常被认为能够减轻信息不对称影响的公司)的证据与印度的大公司支付股息作为未来收益的信号这一观点是一致的。对于我的小公司来说,没有这样的证据。

著录项

  • 作者

    Reeser, Wende Diane.;

  • 作者单位

    Washington University in St. Louis.;

  • 授予单位 Washington University in St. Louis.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2000
  • 页码 234 p.
  • 总页数 234
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;
  • 关键词

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