Naming God and friendship in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Derrida.

摘要

Philosophical discussions of the problem of singularity focus on names and friendship. In religious discourse, naming God reshapes singular reference and transforms our understanding of friendship. This study explores singularity in religious discourse by comparing three positions on names and friendship. Singularity relates uniquely to an individual object. Kripke's neo-Aristotelian theory of proper names' singular reference foregrounds the possibility of a posteriori necessary identity. This necessity clarifies the permanent equality of Aristotelian friends of character. For this Aristotelian approach, both names and friendship find their fulfillment in the cognitive telos of scientific discovery and essentialist classifications.;Thomas Aquinas' approach to divine names parallels his discussion of charity as friendship with God. While improperly signifying God's uniqueness on their own, the "five ways" of natural theology serve as an apophatic moment in the eminent, Pseudo-Dionysian discourse that names God properly as triune. Thomas' discussion of charity as friendship with God integrates concern for particular, concrete action and abstract, universal justice. Much like our theological language, our actions may eminently refer to God's love even while only deficiently signifying it. Thomas' innovation rests in assuming the intricate workings of human language, the virtues, and friendship into the workings of God's providential plan.;Finally, this dissertation explores naming God and friendship in the recent work of Jacques Derrida. Both names and friendship differ and defer in their singular reference and relation; both relating the subject to and estranging it from the object of the relation, they testify to singularity without ever presenting it as such. Testifying to the other's singularity, both naming God and friendship become the site for responsibility even while they risk effacing it. These convergences within the work of Derrida and Thomas highlight their differences. Derrida's focus on testimony as a relation irreducible to cognition contrasts with the traditionally cognitive focus of naming and friendship, criticizing theology's cognitive tendency as an effacement of singularity and foreclosing of responsibility. By rigorously thinking the unknowability of a singular relation, Derrida's work serves a critical function for Thomistic theology, helping it to remain critically vigilant in its openness toward the other.