Preserving the hub: United States-Thai relations during the Vietnam War, 1961--1976.

摘要

During the period of direct American involvement in the Vietnam War, Thailand proved to be one of America's most steadfast ally. As the hub of Washington's anticommunist security effort in Southeast Asia, Thailand permitted the U.S. to base an enormous air armada at Thai airfields and gladly allowed those planes to wage unremitting warfare against Hanoi. Bangkok also sent a sizeable expeditionary force to South Vietnam, served as a transit point for arms going to American-backed allies in Indochina, and supplied soldiers for covert operations in Laos. As late as 1972 Bangkok continued to back America's effort to contain communism and allowed Washington to respond to Hanoi's Easter Offensive with increased bombing attacks on North Vietnam by Thai-based aircraft. Next to South Vietnam, Thailand was America's most dedicated and important ally during the Vietnam War.; This study examines the rise and fall of Bangkok and Washington's wartime partnership. It argues that their alliance rested on shared Cold War fears that monolithic, expansionist communism threatened the security of both nations. Even the Tet Offensive and the Sino-Soviet split could not upset their shared commitment to containing communism in Southeast Asia. Only well after serious political upheaval occurred in both Bangkok and Washington did their relationship fully transform from one rooted in shared anticommunism to a more distant one grounded on pragmatic assessments of each country's national interests.; My dissertation takes issue with the prevailing view that Thailand supported America's regional objectives primarily to oblige its superpower patron and to secure additional economic and military assistance. On the contrary, Thai apprehension about communism long predated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Indeed, by manipulating Washington's obsession with credibility and adherence to the Domino Theory, Thailand actually helped push America to opt for war in Indochina in 1965. My work thus makes clear that Thailand, and, by extension, other U.S. allies in the developing world, were active agents pursuing their own policies rather than dependent client states catering to American demands. As important, my research shows that the "Vietnam Syndrome"---the United States' reluctance to engage directly in ambiguous or internal struggles---first manifested itself in Washington's hands-off approach to Thailand's counterinsurgency effort.