Military mobilization and the escalation and outcome of international crises.

摘要

International crises are an important area of study in international relations because they are often the events that precede wars. This dissertation contributes to this area of research by examining the following questions empirically. How do states interact within a crisis to achieve their goals and are they successful? Finally, what factors make a crisis more likely to escalate to war?; To answer these questions, this dissertation uses existing signaling models of international crises to develop some testable hypotheses. These models argue that states attempt to prevail by signaling to opposing states a greater willingness to go to war, more commonly referred to as demonstrating resolve. States can demonstrate resolve by enacting costly policies. These costs can either make war more likely, impose immediate economic costs, or potentially jeopardize a leader's domestic credibility.; One policy that can generate all three types of costs is military mobilization. This dissertation argues that states that mobilize militarily should be more likely to prevail in an international crisis. In addition, states that are susceptible to generating these costs should be more likely to prevail. Using a theoretically appropriate and novel data set, both of these propositions are empirically verified.; While military mobilization can demonstrate resolve, it can also prepare a state for war. This dissertation argues that some states are likely to view war as unavoidable and choose to mobilize privately to gain a military advantage. This private mobilization should make war more likely. In addition, this dissertation analyzes factors that make a state more likely to choose a private mobilization strategy. Empirical analysis reveals that private mobilization does make war more likely. States are more likely to privately mobilize the more equal in power they are with an opposing state, the greater their level of interest in a crisis, if they are not in an alliance, and if they are not a democracy. Finally, this dissertation finds that selection effects do not threaten analysis of crises if empirical models are appropriately specified. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of how states prevail in a crisis and how crises escalate to war.