What keeps wars going and what finally makes them stop? Historical evidence suggests that wars, once begun, are very difficult to stop. They seem to last much longer and cost much more than belligerents expect at the outset and rational choice scholars would predict. War termination is a bargaining process between two interacting sides. As rational choice theories suggest, belligerents will settle a conflict as soon as they develop an overlapping bargaining space. In this study, I build on these models by developing an argument that refines the domestic mechanisms to explain why each side decides to come to the bargaining table. I develop a model about the domestic coalitions that decide to prosecute and eventually end a war.; There are many possible reasons why a war, once begun, is difficult to stop. I argue that these reasons fall into one of three categories: (1) information arguments, or situations in which the belligerents' leaders do not know that they should end the war; (2) preference arguments, or situations in which the belligerents' leaders do not want to end the war; and (3) entrapment arguments, or situations in which the belligerents' leaders want to end the war but cannot.; To create an overlapping bargaining space and thus end a war, belligerents on both sides must change their expectations about the war. This change in expectations occurs most often with a shift in the belligerents' governing coalitions. A domestic coalition shift is a consequential change in the identity of the decision-makers or a substantive change in the government. In cases of clear battlefield success, a domestic coalition shift on the “losing” side may be sufficient. In cases of ambiguous battlefield performance or stalemate, a shift in the governing coalitions may be necessary on both sides.; I test this model though statistical-correlative analysis and mini-case studies of 18 post-World War II interstate wars and detailed case studies of the Korean and 1965 Indo-Pakistani wars.
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