Science and international environmental regime formation: The informational requirements of cooperation.

摘要

Why do governments address some environmental problems through international policy agreements, and refuse to cooperate on others? This project compares cases of success with cases of failure in the formation of international environmental regimes, and examines how scientific knowledge about the problem affects the chances of cooperation. It is a structured comparison of state initiatives regarding four environmental problems: ozone depletion, acid rain, deforestation, and coral reefs degradation. The former two problems are subject of legally binding treaties, and the latter two are not. Neither political power, nor economic interests, nor international norms can explain the cases.; Unlike previous work that treats scientific knowledge as a single variable, this project distinguishes between three types of information about the problem (its extent, causes and consequences), and examines their roles in policy formation separately. Multilateral scientific assessments on each ecological problem are analyzed and extensive inventories of information are made. Each case study explores the political efforts to create international policy agreements, and observes how the state of knowledge on the three aspects relates to the dynamics of international policy making. Data is collected through document analysis; interviews with policy makers, negotiators and scientists; and through direct observation of negotiations meetings at the United Nations Organization.; Evidence from the cases strongly suggests that some types of information matter more than others. Reliable knowledge about negative cross-border consequences of a problem appears to be an important requirement in the process of policy deliberations, and increases the likelihood for international policy agreements. By contrast, other types of seemingly relevant scientific knowledge appear to be of lesser importance. For instance, complete information on the extent and causes of the problem is neither necessary nor sufficient for regime formation. Governments may enter binding agreements despite high uncertainty about these aspects of a problem. Moreover, the state of knowledge and its correspondence with the political outcomes cannot be explained with reference to power. Powerful political actors do not succeed, and often do even try, to ‘produce’ information that supports their interests and of suppressing information that undermines them.