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Beyond national uniformity: Diverging local economic governance under Japan's decentralization reforms.

机译:超越国家统一:在日本的分权改革下,地方经济治理有所不同。

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摘要

Well known for its centralized local economic system under the national equity principle, Japan has experimented with transforming this regional redistribution system into a new local economic system of governance for more autonomous local economic growth over the past decade. This new local economic governance has been characterized by the increasing involvement of social actors, such as large private corporations and local communities, in policy processes.;This dissertation reveals that new local economic growth strategies for the new local economic governance have operated under very different models in different regions of Japan, although all new local programs have been introduced under the banner of public-private partnership. New partnership programs in the local economic policy arena in the 2000s have moved toward the market model, in which local authorities pursue growth by attracting international business resources, in the major metropolitan areas around Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, whereas they have moved toward the community model, in which local authorities purge growth by mobilizing local organizational resources, in the rest of Japan. The market model is embedded in market reform for deregulation that makes large private corporations' freer activities easy, whereas the community model is an attempt to strengthen the structure of endogenous networks among local authorities and local economic and social elites.;This dissertation highlights two variables to explain regional variations of local economic growth strategies: dual local economic structures and diverging politico-economic coalitions. First, under the rule of Koizumi Junichiro, a coalition of promoting market reform among neoliberal politicians and large private corporations has won politically over a coalition for maintaining national equity among politicians embedded in traditional conservative center-local linkages, local business groups, and local leadership of underdeveloped areas, in national politics. The regional redistribution mechanism stopped functioning in this political choice. Instead, market reform and local community participation have been introduced as alternatives to regional redistribution mechanisms. Second, the major metropolitan areas and other underdeveloped areas, which came to stand on equal conditions for autonomous local economic growth strategies under decentralization reforms, are characterized by different situations in attracting private investment. The competitive regions of the major metropolitan areas have taken the market model as their main local economic growth strategy because they are competitive to attract private investment. In contrast, the protected regions outside the major metropolitan areas have taken the community model as their key local economic growth strategy because they have less competitive local economic structure of fading industries and scare population for attracting private investment.;Over the past decade, reforms for public-private partnership in the local economic policy arena resulted in the disturbance of the Japanese way of balancing market powers and local interests in the postwar period. In the postwar period, the centralized regional redistribution mechanism, led by national politicians and central bureaucracies, functioned as a tool for social integration with consideration for national equity. However, experiments with the new form of local economic governance were not successful in balancing market reform with local community mobilization. The mobilization of local community resources could not match the political role of the regional redistribution mechanism outside the major metropolitan areas. In addition, market reform, which has been more effective in the advanced major metropolitan areas, has produced increasing regional economic disparity. Japan has faced a complicated stand-off between large private corporations detached from specific localities and local communities locked in place, which were connected by national political coordination mechanisms in the postwar period. Although each of two diverging local economic growth strategies has been effective in different regions, there was no national political mechanism for mediating local variations of these localized programs in the 2000s.
机译:日本以在国家平等原则下的集中式地方经济体制而闻名,日本尝试将这一区域再分配系统转变为新的地方经济治理体系,以在过去十年中实现更加自主的地方经济增长。这种新的地方经济治理的特点是,诸如大型私营公司和地方社区之类的社会行为者越来越多地参与政策进程。本论文表明,新的地方经济治理的新的地方经济增长战略在非常不同的情况下运作尽管所有新的地方计划都是在公私合作伙伴关系的旗帜下引入的,但在日本不同地区都采用了这种模式。在2000年代,地方经济政策领域的新伙伴关系计划已转向市场模式,在东京,大阪和名古屋附近的主要大都市地区,地方当局通过吸引国际商业资源来追求增长,而它们已转向市场模式。社区模式,在日本其他地区,地方政府通过动员当地组织资源来促进增长。市场模型被嵌入到放松管制的市场改革中,这使大型私营公司的自由活动变得容易,而社区模型则是试图加强地方当局与地方经济社会精英之间的内生网络的结构。解释地方经济增长战略的区域差异:地方经济结构的双重化和政治经济联盟的分化。首先,在小泉纯一郎的统治下,一个促进新自由主义政客和大型私营公司之间的市场改革的联盟在政治上赢得了一个联盟,该联盟旨在维护传统保守的中枢与地方之间的联系,地方企业集团和地方领导层中的政客之间的国家平等欠发达地区的国家政治。区域重新分配机制在这一政治选择中停止运作。取而代之的是,市场改革和当地社区的参与被引入作为区域再分配机制的替代方案。其次,在大城市地区和其他欠发达地区,在分权改革下,它们在自主的地方经济增长战略上处于同等条件,其特点是吸引私人投资的情况不同。大都市圈的竞争性地区已将市场模型作为其主要的当地经济增长策略,因为它们在吸引私人投资方面具有竞争力。相比之下,主要大都市区以外的保护区将社区模式作为其主要的当地经济增长策略,因为它们的衰落行业竞争激烈的当地经济结构以及吸引私人投资的人口稀少。战后时期,日本在当地经济政策舞台上的公私合营导致日本平衡市场力量和当地利益的方式受到干扰。战后时期,由国家政客和中央官僚机构领导的集中式区域再分配机制,是考虑到国家平等的社会融合工具。但是,尝试用新形式的地方经济治理在平衡市场改革与动员当地社区方面并未取得成功。动员地方社区资源无法与主要大都市区以外的区域再分配机制的政治作用相提并论。此外,在发达的主要大都市地区更有效的市场改革导致区域经济差距越来越大。在战后时期,通过国家政治协调机制将日本与特定地区分离的大型私营公司与锁定在适当位置的当地社区之间,日本面临着复杂的对峙。尽管两种不同的地方经济增长战略中的每一种在不同地区都有效,但在2000年代,尚没有任何国家政治机制来调解这些地方性方案的地方差异。

著录项

  • 作者

    Lee, Jung Hwan.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Asian Studies.;Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 162 p.
  • 总页数 162
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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