Extorting cooperation: A case study of the negotiation and implementation of the 1994 United States-DPRK agreed framework.

摘要

Cooperation theory has tended to focus on how bargains get made, with little attention to the process of implementation and what variables can affect success or failure. This research broadens the scope of cooperation theory to extend to the implementation phase of agreements. The debate between relative and absolute gains underestimates the importance of the pre-negotiating environment to cooperation outcomes. An interaction model based on utility is developed to account for the impact of utility gains and losses prior to bargaining on the negotiation and implementation phase of international cooperation. The model also links cooperation and coercion together conceptually, as they are both informed by a common underlying logic based on state strategies to maximize utility gains or minimize utility losses.; The utility interaction model is then used to analyze the negotiation and implementation of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK framework agreement to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for a U.S. "package deal" of energy supplies, light-water nuclear reactors, and security guarantees. The model provides interesting insights into the negotiation and implementation of the Agreed Framework, shedding light on the causal mechanisms influencing how agreements get made, who controls the process of implementation, and why agreements sometimes fail to get implemented.; The proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, has been an international crisis for more than a decade. At the heart of the crisis are the nuclear weapons and missile programs of North Korea. In the mid-1990s, the United States negotiated an agreement with North Korea to stop the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and for eight years the two sides took steps to implement the agreement, but then in 2002 the agreement collapsed.; This dissertation attempts to explain why these two countries reached this agreement and why they failed to implement it. A typology of cooperation is constructed to categorize the agreement. Then, the interaction model of cooperation based on the concept of utility is constructed to explain the relationship between negotiations and implementation, on the one hand, and the connection between the international and domestic, on the other. Using process-tracing methodology to analyze the step-by-step negotiation and implementation of the agreement, this research will try to uncover the causal mechanisms influencing policy choices.; The Agreed Framework is an excellent case for analysis because of its importance as an example of policies designed to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is also of importance as an unusual cooperative agreement between two adversaries. Of special interest was the nature of the agreement, which saw a stronger state paying a weaker state to alter its policy---a situation that has been dubbed "extortion" or "blackmail" by various analysts.