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Product quality in the distribution channel for retail food products.

机译:食品零售渠道中的产品质量。

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摘要

This study investigates the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer in the distribution channel. The primary focus is the use of product quality as a strategic tool for the manufacturer to improve his overall and relative performance inside the channel. The base model discusses one manufacturer and one retailer interacting in various conditions. First, we look at the variation of the manufacturer's control of quality in the distribution channel under the single product scenario. In the static setting, the impacts of quality on the manufacturer and retailer's pricing decisions and their relative performances depend on the quality cost function specifications. The linear cost schedule for quality produces the more profitable situation for the retailer. On the other hand, the manufacturer performs better in the convex cost specification, suggesting the increasing difficulty in modifying the product quality benefits the manufacturer. The simulations for the static models show that an increase in the quality cost hurts the manufacturer more than the retailer; whereas an increase in elasticity positively affects the manufacturer in larger magnitude than the retailer. The multi-period model for the single product quality addresses quality as an investment-like aspect. In our setup, the consumer demand is influenced by the stock of quality, which can be the reputation or the accumulated brand name generated by the quality flow in each period. The optimal quality decisions indicate the existence of the optimal quality stock level, where, using the quality flow, the manufacturer adjusts his quality stock gradually to the optimal long-run level regardless of whether the initial stock is above or below the optimal level. Despites the constant unit cost of quality, the solution for the optimal path recommends the gradual adjustment instead of the rapid approach.;Next, we consider a more competitive setting between the manufacturer and the retailer in the distribution channel through the use of the private label product. The retailer offers a similar product to the national brand product. We derive a demand specification from the reservation price schedule and the consumer distribution. We find that the national brand manufacturer generally tries to differentiate his product from the private label through the use of product quality. The increase in the national brand product quality benefits the retailer to a greater extent since the improved national brand product allows the retailer to increase the private label retail price without having to improve its characteristics as consumers switch from the national brand to the private label products. Both the increase in the quality cost and the private label quality improvement produce similar outcomes for prices, product quality and market shares. Both the increase in quality cost and the improvement in the private label quality increase the quality differentiation, raise all retail prices and reduce the demand for the national brand product. Because of the high increase in the national brand price, the retailer can gain higher profit through the increase in the private label price and the expansion of its demand.;We extend our distribution channel model to address the situation where the national brand manufacturer supplies the private label product to the retailer. Again, the optimization specification influences the outcomes. We modify the demand to allow for non-purchase customers who may decide to start purchasing later. When the retailer chooses both the national brand and the private label retail prices, we find that the optimal supply and pricing decisions for each product depend entirely on the cost and quality parameters for each of the products. The parameters of the national brand production do not affect the decisions for the private label production. On the other hand, when the retailer imposes a fixed markup for the manufacturer's retail pricing, we observe the connections between the parameters of the two products in all of the optimal outcomes. The decision of the national brand manufacturer to supply the private label product depends on the production costs and the product quality levels of both products, as well as the relative quality between the national brand and the private label products.;Using the Dominick's Finer Food scanner database, we investigate the theoretical results empirically. Because of the lack in the direct quality information, we use proxies and indicators instead of the actual product quality level. We identify the products with improvements and the national brand and private label pairings for the empirical tests for the single product model and the national brand and private label competition model, respectively. We use the price difference as the primary proxy for the quality difference and quality level, as well as considering the elasticity influences on the quality and other market outcomes for the case of product improvement. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:这项研究调查了分销渠道中制造商和零售商之间的关系。主要重点是使用产品质量作为制造商改善渠道内部整体和相对绩效的战略工具。基本模型讨论了在各种条件下进行交互的一个制造商和一个零售商。首先,我们考察在单一产品方案下制造商对分销渠道质量控制的变化。在静态设置中,质量对制造商和零售商的定价决策及其相对性能的影响取决于质量成本函数规范。质量的线性成本计划为零售商带来了更有利可图的情况。另一方面,制造商在凸成本规格中表现更好,这表明提高产品质量的难度越来越大,这对制造商有利。静态模型的仿真表明,质量成本的增加对制造商的伤害大于对零售商的伤害;弹性的提高对制造商的影响大于零售商。单一产品质量的多周期模型将质量视为投资方面。在我们的设置中,消费者需求受质量库存的影响,质量可以是每个时期质量流产生的声誉或累积的品牌名称。最佳质量决策表明存在最佳质量库存水平,在这种情况下,制造商会使用质量流将其质量库存逐渐调整至最佳长期水平,而不管初始库存是高于还是低于最佳水平。尽管质量的单位成本不变,但最佳路径的解决方案建议逐步调整而不是快速方法。接下来,我们考虑通过使用自有品牌在分销渠道中制造商和零售商之间更具竞争性的设置产品。零售商提供与国家品牌产品类似的产品。我们从预订价格表和消费者分布中得出需求规格。我们发现,国家品牌制造商通常会尝试通过使用产品质量来将其产品与自有品牌区分开。民族品牌产品质量的提高在很大程度上使零售商受益,因为随着消费者从民族品牌转向私有品牌产品,改良的民族品牌产品允许零售商提高自有品牌零售价,而不必提高其特性。质量成本的增加和自有品牌质量的提高都在价格,产品质量和市场份额方面产生了相似的结果。质量成本的增加和自有品牌质量的改善都增加了质量差异,提高了所有零售价格,并减少了对民族品牌产品的需求。由于国家品牌价格的大幅上涨,零售商可以通过提高自有品牌价格和扩大需求来获得更高的利润。;我们扩展了分销渠道模型,以解决国家品牌制造商提供商品的情况。私人商标产品给零售商。同样,优化规范会影响结果。我们修改需求,以允许可能决定以后开始购买的非购买客户。当零售商同时选择国家品牌和私人品牌零售价时,我们发现每种产品的最佳供应和定价决策完全取决于每种产品的成本和质量参数。国家品牌生产的参数不会影响自有品牌生产的决定。另一方面,当零售商对制造商的零售价格强加固定价格时,我们观察到所有最佳结果中两种产品的参数之间的联系。国家品牌制造商决定提供私人标签产品的决定取决于两种产品的生产成本和产品质量水平,以及国家品牌和私人标签产品之间的相对质量。使用Dominick的Finer Food扫描仪数据库中,我们根据经验研究理论结果。由于缺乏直接的质量信息,因此我们使用代理和指标来代替实际的产品质量水平。我们分别针对单个产品模型和国家品牌与私人品牌竞争模型进行了实证检验,确定了需要改进的产品以及国家品牌和私人品牌配对。我们使用价格差异作为质量差异和质量水平的主要代表,以及在产品改进时考虑弹性对质量和其他市场结果的影响。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)

著录项

  • 作者

    Toommongkol, Worawan.;

  • 作者单位

    The Pennsylvania State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Pennsylvania State University.;
  • 学科 Agriculture Food Science and Technology.;Economics General.;Economics Commerce-Business.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 262 p.
  • 总页数 262
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:45:00

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