Essays in incentive and information economics.

摘要

My dissertation studies issues in information and incentives economics. Chapter 1 examines how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver unobservable effort when potential operators are wealth-constrained. I show that either a pooling or a separating contract can arise in equilibrium. In a separating contract, the more capable potential operator is either selected more often but awarded a smaller share of profit; or selected less often but awarded a larger share of profit.; The appeals process is used in many organizations (including administrative agencies, sports organizations, regulatory authorities, companies, etc.). Chapter 2 examines the effect of the appeals process on incentive contracts in the presence of imperfect performance evaluation and limited liability. Some surprising results emerge. For example, appeals may be denied even if the appeals process is quite accurate and costless. Furthermore, the appellant bears all the cost of any appeals. Also, an agent may be paid more initially for minimum performance than for superior performance. Under certain conditions, an increased accuracy of initial observation may reduce welfare. Welfare can also increase as the cost of the appeals process increases.; Chapter 3 analyzes how a buyer optimally contracts with a seller who is privately informed about his likely costs. Eventually the seller may learn more about his actual cost after signing the contract. I demonstrate that sellers prefer riskier cost distributions. Optimal contracts offer sellers with riskier cost distributions greater discretion in choosing output levels, whereas production choices are more restricted for sellers with more certain cost distributions intended to extract rents from riskier sellers. The buyer also prefers contracting with sellers with riskier cost distributions. However, in some settings, the buyer prefers sellers to be uninformed about their cost distributions.