At provincial gates: The impact of locally concentrated foreign direct investment on provincial autonomy and economic reform.

摘要

My dissertation addresses the following question: How does foreign direct investment (FDI) influence the economic institution building process in transition states?; I argue that the voice of investors is substantial, but can be limited without domestic agents, who simultaneously benefit and are empowered by foreign inflows. In order to carefully lay out the micro-logic of my ideas, I narrow my focus to one channel of this dynamic---the role that FDI plays in empowering pro-reform provincial and regional governments against the center, when central leaders are hesitant to construct new economic institutions or are trapped in Joel Hellman's partial reform equilibrium (PRE).1 I test this theory through hierarchical growth modeling of 30 transition economies over 10 years, combined with a rigorous study of Vietnam, a country that should be stuck in partial reform according to Hellman's logic due to the early success of state owned enterprises in capitalizing on price reform without corresponding privatization. In my analysis of Vietnam, I make use of formal theory, surveys, hierarchical growth and cross sectional time series modeling of de facto decentralization in Vietnam's 61 provinces, and case studies of four provinces at varying levels of FDI in-flows.; After demonstrating the important impact of stocks of FDI and the push of foreign investors in generating provincial economic reform outside of central law, I show how these local experiments percolate upwards to national legislation. National legislation of economic reforms results from a combination of strengthened provincial bargaining, success of local reforms, and the ability of reformers in the central government to employ this success in national debates.; In the final chapter, the generalizability of my model is explored by analyzing the data and experiences of provincial-driven economic reform in four transition countries with varying levels of FDI (China, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan).; 1 Hellman argues that states without coalition-oriented governments will have their reform process captured by early winners of economic reform. These winners use there new found economic power to block future progress on economic reform that might endanger the rents they gained from an earlier stage in the reform process. Hellman, Joel.1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." World Politics 50, January, 203--34.