The dynamics of cooperative and coercive intergovernmental relations in the 1990s: Measuring and explaining national influence as perceived by state administrators.

摘要

The "devolution revolution" was a central issue in American intergovernmental relations in the 1990s. Judgments about the outcomes of intergovernmental policy changes varied among scholars of American federalism. Some argued that intergovernmental relations shifted substantially in the direction of devolution toward the states in the 1990s. Others were skeptical about the existence or degree of devolution during the decade. However, clear-cut and conclusive empirical evidence is lacking with respect to which of these two arguments offer a more complete understanding of intergovernmental relations in the 1990s. As an effort to identify an accurate picture of current American intergovernmental relations, this dissertation empirically investigated shifts in state-national relations during the 1990s. The research centered on national fiscal and regulatory influences on the states. Models were developed identifying factors explaining the variation in perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory influences by state agency heads. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to analyze responses from the 1994 and 1998 American State Administrators Project (ASAP) surveys. The results reflect for major findings about the dynamics of state-national relations in the 1990s. First, there was an identifiable and distinct decline in the aggregate and average levels of national fiscal and regulatory influences between 1994 and 1998. Just as national influence has accrued gradually across prior decades, it appeared to decline gradually in the 1990s. Second, state-national relations varied across different intergovernmental contexts, that is, by types of agency and geographical regions. A disaggregated picture of state-national relations by agency types and regions disclosed different and changing patterns. Third, there was a clear and noteworthy shift toward convergence in perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory influences. This empirical finding lends credence to the presence of "coercive cooperation" in state-national relations near the end of the 20th century. Fourth, several variables were significant in shaping administrators' perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory influences. These included (1) state administrators' formal position, (2) political party affiliation, (3) agency's fiscal dependency on and diversity of federal aid, (4) proportions of federally owned land in each state, and (5) citizens' party identification.