Governance structure and weapon innovation: The case of unmanned aerial vehicles.

摘要

Since 1987, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were a top priority for Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD), yet after 15 years of high-level attention, the military had disappointingly few of these innovative systems. Why? Conventional explanations, including immature technologies and pilot bias, offered only partial insight. Instead, this study employed the concept of "governance structure" to examine the interorganizational relations among the key actors involved in weapon acquisition: the military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress. The launching point was adoption of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and Packard Commission reforms, which centralized authority in DoD and promoted jointness among the Services, to evaluate their impact on innovation.; Four sets of findings emerged. At the level of intra-Service relations, internal organizational orientation affected when and how each Service embraced UAVs. The Army was most prone to strong civilian intervention, the Navy to lengthy observation of combat operations, the Marines to cheap and small-scale initiative, and the Air Force to interservice or interagency rivalry. At the level of interservice relations, centralized entities played a key role in focusing the national security establishment and developing programmatic capabilities, but were poor at integrating systems into the Services' force structures. At the level of civil military-relations, the Services reacted against centralized authority only when their autonomy was threatened and there was a partisan or political divide between the administration and Congress. At the level of executive-congressional relations, Congress curtailed the centralized authorities itself had created when significant policy differences arose.; There are many policy implications for military innovation and organizational design. Pentagon leaders must differentiate among the Services in implementing change. Centralized entities are needed for nascent technologies with high future warfighting relevance. Industrial policy that better blends smaller and larger contractors can accelerate the innovation cycle. Streamlined acquisition mechanisms must only be selectively used. DoD civilians must more actively court congressional support prevent the Services' ability from seeking injunction from Congress. And the Services must provide proper organizational support, including appropriate personnel incentives, to enable proper integration of innovative systems into the military.