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Essays on competition in electricity markets.

机译:关于电力市场竞争的论文。

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摘要

The first chapter shows how technology decisions affect entry in commodity markets with oligopolistic competition, like the electricity market. I demonstrate an entry deterrence effect that works through cost uncertainty. Technology's cost uncertainty affects spot market expected profits through forward market trades. Therefore, incentives to engage in forward trading shape firms' decisions on production technologies. I show that high-cost but low-risk technologies are adopted by risk-averse incumbents to deter entry. Strategic technology adoption can end in a equilibrium where high-cost technologies prevail over low-cost but riskier ones. In the case of incumbents who are less risk-averse than entrants, entry deterrence is achieved by choosing riskier technologies. The main results do not depend on who chooses their technology first.;Chapter two examines the Chilean experience on auctions for long-term supply contracts in electricity markets from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible-good auction model, I provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. The model is extended to include potential strategic behavior on contracting decisions. Empirical estimations confirm the main determinants of bidding behavior and show heterogeneity in the marginal cost of over-contracting depending on size and incumbency.;Chapter three analyzes the lag in capacity expansion in the Chilean electricity market from 2000 to 2004. Regarded as a result of regulatory uncertainty, the role of delays in the construction of a large hydro-power plant has been overlooked by the literature. We argue that those delays postponed projected investment and gave small windows of opportunity that only incumbents could take advantage of. We are able to retrace the history of investments through real-time information from the regulator's reports and a simple model enables us to explain the effect of those delays on suggested and under-construction investments.
机译:第一章介绍了技术决策如何通过寡头竞争(如电力市场)影响商品市场的进入。我展示了通过成本不确定性起作用的进入威慑效应。技术的成本不确定性通过远期市场交易影响现货市场的预期利润。因此,进行远期交易的动机决定了企业对生产技术的决定。我表明,规避风险的企业采用了高成本但低风险的技术来阻止进入。战略性技术的采用可以最终达到平衡,在这种平衡中,高成本技术胜过低成本但风险更高的技术。对于在职者比在职者而言规避风险的人,可以通过选择风险更高的技术来实现进入威慑。主要结果并不取决于谁先选择技术。第二章考察了智利从2006年至2011年在电力市场上长期供电合同的拍卖经验。使用可分割拍卖品,我提供了一个理论框架,以预期的现货价格和合约头寸解释竞价行为。该模型已扩展为包括签约决策的潜在战略行为。实证估计证实了投标行为的主要决定因素,并显示了过度合同的边际成本中的异质性,具体取决于规模和在职人数。第三章分析了智利电力市场从2000年至2004年的产能扩张滞后。监管不确定性,延迟在大型水力发电厂建设中的作用已被文献所忽略。我们认为,这些延误推迟了预计的投资,并给了小窗口的机会,只有老牌企业可以利用。我们能够通过监管机构报告中的实时信息来追溯投资的历史,而简单的模型使我们能够解释这些延误对建议的和建设中的投资的影响。

著录项

  • 作者单位

    Georgetown University.;

  • 授予单位 Georgetown University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Latin American Studies.;Energy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 161 p.
  • 总页数 161
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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