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Managing multiple selling channels in technology driven markets.

机译:在技​​术驱动的市场中管理多个销售渠道。

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摘要

In this dissertation I develop three game theoretic models that capture the interactions between buyers and sellers in B2C, B2B and software markets, when sellers can utilize multiple selling channels, and hence need to understand the relationships between demands on the different channels.; In the first model, presented in Chapter 3, I examine how sellers in B2C markets can use posted prices and online auctions in parallel to sell to heterogeneous consumers. I model consumer choice of channels, and thus market segmentation, and find that consumers who value the item for more than its posted price use a threshold policy to choose between the two channels. I explain how optimizing the design-parameters enables the seller to effectively segment the market so that the two channels reinforce each other and cannibalization is mitigated.; In Chapter 4, I model a B2B spot market with two supplier types: a supplier who faces contracted demand with fixed unit price, and a supplier who works solely on the spot market. I examine when the supplier that has contracts should use the spot market as an additional channel, which supplier type benefits more from the existence of the spot market, and which supplier type has a higher incentive to invest in extending the spot market. I study how the contracted demand affects the production decision and profit of the supplier with no contracts, and I show that the supplier that has contracts and buyer-firms benefit from negative correlation between the demands on the two channels.; In Chapter 5, I develop a conceptual and analytical model of the interaction between a base-software producer, ISVs selling specialized applications that run on the base-software, and user firms, in a horizontally differentiated market. The model captures the tradeoffs user-firms face when choosing between in-house development of business applications and buying packaged applications. I show that as application development cost decreases, the base-software producer prefers having a network of ISVs rather than developing and selling integrated applications.
机译:在本文中,我开发了三个博弈论模型,它们捕获了B2C,B2B和软件市场中买卖双方之间的互动,此时卖方可以利用多种销售渠道,因此需要了解不同渠道上需求之间的关系。在第3章中介绍的第一个模型中,我研究了B2C市场中的卖方如何并行使用发布价格和在线拍卖来向异构消费者出售产品。我对消费者选择渠道的方式进行了建模,从而对市场进行了细分,发现对商品的重视程度超过其发布价格的消费者使用阈值策略在两个渠道之间进行选择。我将说明优化设计参数如何使卖方能够有效地细分市场,从而使两个渠道相互加强并减轻同类相抵。在第4章中,我为具有两个供应商类型的B2B现货市场建模:一个供应商以固定的单价面对合同需求,另一个供应商仅在现货市场上工作。我研究了签订合同的供应商何时应使用现货市场作为附加渠道,哪种供应商类型会从现货市场的存在中受益更多,以及哪种供应商类型有更大的动力去扩展现货市场。我研究了合同需求如何影响没有合同的供应商的生产决策和利润,并且我发现拥有合同和买方公司的供应商将从两个渠道的需求之间的负相关中受益。在第5章中,我开发了一个基础软件生产商,销售在基础软件上运行的专用应用程序的ISV与用户公司,在水平差异化的市场中进行交互的概念模型和分析模型。当在内部开发业务应用程序和购买打包的应用程序之间进行选择时,该模型捕获了用户-公司之间的权衡。我表明,随着应用程序开发成本的降低,基础软件生产商更喜欢拥有独立软件开发商的网络,而不是开发和销售集成应用程序。

著录项

  • 作者

    Etzion, Hila.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Rochester.;

  • 授予单位 University of Rochester.;
  • 学科 Economics Commerce-Business.; Business Administration Management.; Business Administration Marketing.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 120 p.
  • 总页数 120
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;贸易经济;贸易经济;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:42:23

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