Power, Profits, and Politics: Energy Security and Cooperation in Eurasia.

摘要

This study explores varying outcomes of energy cooperation, defined as diplomatic relations, bilateral trade, and investment in oil and natural gas. Tests of theories pertinent to energy security - broadly speaking, realism, liberalism, and domestic politics---reveal that they alone can offer only a narrow and one-sided explanation, not embracing the complexity of energy issues. Nevertheless, using them as a starting point, this study outlined a structured framework that incorporates three variables---economic potential, geopolitical rivalry, and domestic interest groups---that are applied to the cases of U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Azerbaijan, and Russia-Germany energy ties. This study concludes that if the economic potential (defined by geographic proximity and resource availability) is very high, such as in the case of Russia-Germany, states can overcome geopolitical rivalries and historical enmities in favor of energy cooperation. However, if the economic potential is relatively low (because of geographic obstacles or easily available alternative suppliers, as in the cases of U.S.-Russia and U.S.-Azerbaijan), then geopolitics prevails---for example, to bypass Russia or to limit American access to contracts in Russia when U.S.-Russian relations are strained. In all the cases explored here, domestic interest groups have mixed influence: if they are united along energy issues, they usually successfully achieve their energy policy goals, although the impact of these groups often becomes intertwined with state interests. In other situations, when powerful interest groups are divided or focused on non-energy-related issues (such as ethnic priorities), their influence over energy deals is much lower.