The impact of incentives, uncertainty and transaction costs on the efficiency of public sector outsourcing contracts.

摘要

Since the late 1970s, the world has experienced a wave of microeconomic reform that has resulted in the privatisation of many previously State-owned assets, as well as other reforms directed at improving the efficiency of government business enterprises. This dissertation focuses on one important instrument of reform: outsourcing of public-sector service provision. Despite the prevalence of outsourcing, there has been relatively little empirical work analysing the effects of outsourcing at the contract level.;Thirdly, the impact of contract design on the efficiency of outsourcing arrangements was analysed. It is well known that contract theory predicts a trade-off between incentives and risk. Using the standard principal-agent framework, a simple model is developed to analyse the effects of demand uncertainty on the risk-incentive trade-off. This model is then tested using data from maintenance services contracts at two corporatised water retailers in Melbourne: an environment that is characterised by high levels of both cost and demand uncertainty. Using a general linear regression model, the results obtained indicate that the moral hazard effect dominated the risk premium effect.;This dissertation addresses three important empirical issues related to outsourcing. First, analysis of the magnitude and sources of cost savings associated with outsourcing was undertaken using a present value costing framework. Unlike other studies, this study includes transaction costs and considers how costs change over the life of the contract. The results indicate that savings of 37 per cent were achieved in the first year of contract operation---savings that were achieved through a combination of reductions in pay and conditions, labour-saving technological change and reductions in inefficiency. Secondly, the dissertation considered why the level of savings achieved fell to 24 per cent following contract variations at the end of year 1. Some evidence indicated that this may have been due to opportunistic behaviour or hold-up: that the contract service provider may have taken advantage of contractual incompleteness and increased its price during the course of contract renegotiations. Although hold-up is an important theme in the literature on contracts, little empirical work has been undertaken in verifying its existence.