Integrity as a moral virtue

摘要

I pursue two aims in this dissertation. The first aim is to challenge the following claim: one's commitment to immoral ideals can be regarded as the basis for an ascription of integrity, even when one knows that the ideals are immoral. I discuss two opposing views. On the first view that Robert Adams holds, the commitment to immoral ideals is excellent and can be the basis for an ascription of integrity. I argue that there are reasons to think that the commitment is not excellent. On the second opposing view that Harry Frankfurt holds, one can live well by virtue of the commitment to immoral ideals, and the commitment is the basis for an ascription of integrity. I argue that the commitment cannot be an appropriate way to live well. Additionally, I discuss the case in which one is committed to wicked ideals not knowingly that the ideals are wicked. With respect to this issue, I complement Halfon's view that the commitment to wicked ideals can be the basis for an ascription of integrity, if the commitment is made in accordance with the examination of one's beliefs. The second aim is to put forward an account of integrity, according to which one has integrity with respect to X if and only if 1) one is committed to X, 2) one acts in accordance with X, and 3) one is not dogmatic in holding one's commitment to X. Being committed to X, one appreciates the importance of X and appropriately responds to it. X, which should not be wicked or frivolous, can be various things including people, cause, and ideal. The ways of acting may vary in accordance with what X is. One should act consistently in accordance with X, although some backslidings, unless they involve serious moral wrong, are acceptable. To be non-dogmatic in maintaining one's commitments, one should have genuine interest in considering other people's opinions regarding what is worth doing, and one should be able to critically examine oneself or others from a perspective that goes beyond current commitments.