At the intersection of philosophy and biology lies the species ontology problem. What sort of thing is a biological species? The traditional view is that species are natural kinds, but the individuality thesis has usurped the traditional view, arguing that species are not kinds and instead are individuals. Putatively, the individuality thesis has implications for debates ranging from biological classification and conservation, to moral philosophy. I challenge the individuality thesis. First, I argue that individualists have neglected promising revisions of natural kinds theory: species may be kinds. Second, I argue that there are different kinds of cohesion, that gene flow does not "hold species together," and that, therefore, species do not display the kind of cohesion that individuality requires: species are not individuals. Moreover, analyzing cohesion in terms of the philosophical notion of realization affords novel insights into the nature of cohesion, species, agency and individuality more generally.
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