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Optimizing providers' profit in peer networks applying automatic pricing and game theory.

机译:应用自动定价和博弈论优化对等网络中提供商的利润。

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摘要

This research exploits the agility of game theory by synthesizing economic theories and Internet traffic engineering techniques to optimize the profit of Internet Service Providers (ISP), and to meet the customer desire of automatic subscription from any provider that offers the lowest price.; We propose a new Automatic Price Transaction-based One-to-Many Peer Network architecture that facilitates customers' options for subscribing to services from providers based on the negotiated price. This model is for enterprise-provider IP peer networks or customer-provider wireless networks. In this model, customers and providers perform simultaneous price negotiations by a Sealed-Bid-Reverse auction protocol. We suggest Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) entities and call flow to implement the mechanism. Our model extends the one-to-one IP peering architecture (IP Network-Network-Interface) of the Alliance for Telecommunications and Industry Solutions (ATIS). Our model also extends the one-to-one Online Charging architecture of the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).; Implementation of the architecture causes strategic interaction among the providers; thus, a game theory model is required to compute the service price and to optimize the providers' profit.; We propose a new game theory model---the Providers Optimized Game in Internet Traffic---to optimize providers' profit in the proposed architecture subject to constraints of network architecture, traffic pattern, and game strategies. This model determines strategic price using a myopic Markovian-Bayesian game of incomplete information and an extension of previous work based on the Bertrand oligopoly model. Our model is sensitive to the dynamic Internet traffic demand, the congestion in networks, and the service class. Selecting a strategically appropriate price is one of our methods to optimize profit; the others are minimizing the network congestion sensitive cost and optimizing routes. The model associates a congestion indicator---the mean IP packet count in a network queue system---with the service cost. An M/M/1 queuing analysis determines the mean packet count. The model applies two well-known non-linear programming techniques, the Gradient Projection algorithm and the Golden section line search, to minimize the mean packet count and to optimize routes in providers' networks.; This dissertation presents the novel models, validates the models by analyses and simulations, evaluates advantages of the models, determines providers' the best strategies for optimizing their profit, and introduces traffic-engineering applications. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:该研究通过综合经济理论和互联网流量工程技术来利用博弈论的敏捷性,以优化互联网服务提供商(ISP)的利润,并满足客户从任何提供最低价格的提供商那里进行自动订阅的需求。我们提出了一种新的基于自动价格交易的一对多对等网络体系结构,该体系结构可方便客户根据协商的价格从提供商处订购服务。该模型适用于企业提供者的IP对等网络或客户提供者的无线网络。在此模型中,客户和提供者通过密封反向投标拍卖协议同时执行价格协商。我们建议使用会话初始协议(SIP)实体和呼叫流程来实现该机制。我们的模型扩展了电信和工业解决方案联盟(ATIS)的一对一IP对等体系结构(IP网络-网络接口)。我们的模型还扩展了第三代合作伙伴计划(3GPP)的一对一在线收费体系结构。架构的实现导致提供商之间的战略互动;因此,需要一个博弈论模型来计算服务价格并优化提供商的利润。我们提出了一种新的博弈论模型-互联网流量中的提供商优化游戏-来在网络架构,流量模式和游戏策略的约束下,在提议的架构中优化提供商的利润。该模型使用不完整信息的近视Markovian-Bayes博弈和基于Bertrand寡头垄断模型的先前工作的扩展来确定战略价格。我们的模型对动态Internet流量需求,网络拥塞和服务类别敏感。选择具有战略意义的价格是我们优化利润的方法之一;其他的则是最小化网络拥塞敏感成本并优化路由。该模型将拥塞指示器(网络队列系统中的平均IP数据包计数)与服务成本相关联。 M / M / 1排队分析确定平均数据包计数。该模型采用了两种众所周知的非线性编程技术:梯度投影算法和黄金分割线搜索,以最大程度地减少平均数据包数量并优化提供商网络中的路由。本文提出了新颖的模型,通过分析和仿真验证了模型,评估了模型的优势,确定了提供商优化利润的最佳策略,并介绍了流量工程应用。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)

著录项

  • 作者

    Khan, Sohel Q.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Kansas.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Kansas.;
  • 学科 Engineering Electronics and Electrical.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 238 p.
  • 总页数 238
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 无线电电子学、电信技术;
  • 关键词

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