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Emotion, control, and responsibility: A historical investigation (Nicolas Malebranche, Benedictus de Spinoza, David Hume).

机译:情感,控制和责任:历史调查(尼古拉斯·马累布朗切,本尼迪克特·德·斯皮诺莎,大卫·休姆)。

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摘要

In this dissertation I engage a problem that emerges when we consider our pretheoretical views of the emotions. On the one hand we view emotions as non-rational impulses over which we have no control. On the other hand, we see emotions as manifestations of our character for which we are, and should be, held responsible. The tension between these two views of emotions emerges in the following problem. Responsibility presupposes control, and so if emotions cannot be controlled, then people should not be held responsible for their emotions. But, as a matter of fact, we do hold people responsible for their emotions. This suggests that our moral practices, at least with respect to the emotions, are inconsistent and thus unjustified.; I engage this problem by addressing the question of whether, and if so how, we can control our emotions to the writings of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hume. In Chapter One I develop the problem sketched above, situate it within the contemporary philosophical landscape, and explain how the historical investigation I undertake helps to clarify it. In Chapter Two I explore Malebranche's approach to reconciling two apparently contradictory claims: that God is the only entity with 'real' causal power, and that it is man, and not God, who is responsible for man's emotions and passion-induced sins. Chapter Three explores Spinoza's effort to articulate a conception of control for the emotions that does not run afoul of his deterministic metaphysics. Hume, whose writings are the subject of Chapter Four, reorients the discussion by challenging the claim that responsibility presupposes control, insisting that though there is little or nothing a person can do to control her emotions, our moral practices are in no way compromised by this fact. In Chapter Five, I conclude by reconsidering the contemporary problem sketched above, and suggest a variety of ways in which the writings of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hume might help us resolve it to our satisfaction.
机译:在这篇论文中,我涉及到一个问题,当我们考虑我们对情感的理论上的看法时。一方面,我们认为情绪是我们无法控制的非理性冲动。另一方面,我们认为情感是我们性格的体现,我们应该为之负责。这两种情感观之间的张力出现在以下问题中。责任是控制的先决条件,因此,如果无法控制情绪,则不应对人们的情绪负责。但是,事实上,我们确实要求人们为自己的情感负责。这表明我们的道德实践,至少在情感方面是不一致的,因此是不合理的。我通过解决以下问题来解决这个问题:我们是否可以以及是否可以控制我们对Malebranche,Spinoza和Hume作品的情绪。在第一章中,我提出了上面概述的问题,将其置于当代哲学视野中,并解释了我所进行的历史研究如何有助于阐明这一问题。在第二章中,我探讨了马兰布兰奇调和两个明显矛盾的主张的方法:上帝是唯一具有“真正”因果力量的实体,是人而不是上帝,它负责人的情感和由激情引起的罪恶。第三章探讨了斯宾诺莎努力表达对情感的控制的观念,这种观念并不违背他的确定性形而上学。休ume(其著作是第四章的主题)通过质疑责任以控制为前提的主张重新定位了讨论的方向,坚持认为尽管一个人很少或无能为力控制自己的情绪,但我们的道德实践绝不会因此受到损害。事实。在第五章中,我通过重新考虑上面概述的当代问题来结束,并提出了多种方式,使马来布兰奇,斯宾诺莎和休ume的著作可以帮助我们解决它,使我们满意。

著录项

  • 作者

    Bowditch, Nathaniel.;

  • 作者单位

    The Johns Hopkins University.;

  • 授予单位 The Johns Hopkins University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 240 p.
  • 总页数 240
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:41:16

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