Policy making and electoral politics: Three essays on the political determinants of social welfare spending in Mexico, 1988--2003.

摘要

The dissertation investigates on the effects of electoral politics on the distribution of government outlays for three social welfare programs in Mexico in the period of democratic transition, using political business cycles and distributive politics models. The first essay makes a critical review of the two most widely used theoretical models to explain the political component on the distribution of policy benefits: the political business cycle and distributive politics. I jointly test the implications of these theories on a specific federal poverty alleviation program in Mexico (FONAES) using monthly time series and state panel data on federal outlays for a decade in which electoral pressures rose systematically.;Using the same framework the second essay compares various poverty alleviation programs. I explain how program allocation rules have evolved in the poverty alleviation strategy during two and a half decades in Mexico and why these changes that appear to limit political manipulation might not necessarily have the desire effect. With administrative data from a set of government agencies on different programs I estimate similar models to those specified in the previous paper to test whether different allocation rules represent changes in the political bias. For the final essay 0I use municipal level information on a decentralized social program in order to test for the effects of decentralization on the politics of distribution.;The main findings on this research are, first, that policy instruments for distribution of federal outlays for social welfare programs in Mexico are still highly influenced by electoral politics. Second, timing resources to elections has been less evident as a political strategy due to the gradual implementation of programs or to decentralization. Third, allocation is still highly influenced by partisan considerations. Former opposition parties have succeeded in increasing their share of resources as vote for their party increases. Fourth, decentralization has affected the power balance as party affiliation of state governors is now relevant for distribution at the municipal level.