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Auctions with buy prices.

机译:带有购买价格的拍卖。

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摘要

Internet auction sites eBay and Yahoo have developed an innovative hybrid auction designs that incorporate buy prices. My dissertation focuses on eBay's Buy It Now (BIN, hereafter) auction. The BIN hybrid auction combines a standard ascending bid auction with a posted-price offer "buy price".;Chapter 1: Risk aversion and impatience of either the bidders or the seller have mainly been used to explain the popularity of BIN auctions in IPV models. Using a pure common value framework, we model auctions with buy prices, when the bidders and the seller are either risk neutral or risk averse. It characterizes equilibriumbidding strategies in a general setup and then analyzes a seller's incentive to post a buy price. There is no incentive to post a buy price for a risk neutral seller. But when the seller is risk averse, a suitably chosen buy price can raise the seller's expected utility.;Chapter 2: The theoretical predictions from Wooders and Reynolds (2003) and Chapter 1 show that the introduction of a buy price causes the seller's revenue to move in opposite directions in private value and common value settings. Our results show that a buy price raises seller revenue in private value auctions. The results for common value auctions are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. As a result, we develop and estimate a behavioral model of common value BIN auctions based on the winner's curse and overweighting of a bidder's private information which explains all the departures from the rational model.;Chapter 3: Haile and Tamer (2003) first used an incomplete econometric model in an auction context, assuming that bidders bid up to their values and do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat. Chapter 3 extends these incomplete models to eBay's BIN auctions. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model for BIN independent private value auctions with a stochastic and unknown number of potential bidders who enter the auction sequentially using a new data set 10 of 3245 eBay auctions of Pentium-3 laptops that ran between 22 July to 10 August 2005.
机译:互联网拍卖网站eBay和Yahoo开发了一种创新的混合拍卖设计,其中包含了购买价格。我的论文集中在eBay的“立即购买”(BIN,此后)拍卖上。 BIN混合拍卖将标准的递增竞标与发布的报价“购买价”相结合。;第1章:风险规避和投标人或卖方的不耐烦已主要用于解释BIN拍卖在IPV模型中的受欢迎程度。当投标者和卖方风险中立或规避风险时,我们使用纯粹的共同价值框架,以购买价格为拍卖模型。它描述了一般设置中的均衡竞价策略,然后分析了卖方发布购买价格的动机。没有动机为风险中立的卖方发布购买价格。但是,当卖方厌恶风险时,适当选择的购买价格可以提高卖方的预期效用。第二章:Wooders and Reynolds(2003)和第1章的理论预测表明,引入购买价格会使卖方的收益增加。在私有值和公共值设置中以相反的方向移动。我们的结果表明,购买价格可以提高私人价值拍卖中的卖方收入。普通价值拍卖的结果与理论预测不一致。结果,我们基于中标者的诅咒和对投标人私人信息的过高估计,开发并估算了具有共同价值的BIN拍卖行为模型,该模型解释了所有偏离理性模型的情况。第3章:Haile和Tamer(2003)首次使用拍卖环境中的不完整计量经济学模型,假设竞标者出价达到自己的价值,并且不允许对手以他们愿意击败的价格获胜。第3章将这些不完整的模型扩展到eBay的BIN拍卖。我们使用7月22日至8月10日之间进行的3245次eBay奔腾3笔记本电脑拍卖的新数据集10中的随机和未知数目的潜在竞标者来随机进入未知数量的潜在竞标者,从而开发和估计BIN独立私人价值拍卖的均衡模型2005。

著录项

  • 作者

    Shahriar, Quazi Hasnat.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Arizona.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Arizona.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Economics Commerce-Business.;Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 129 p.
  • 总页数 129
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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