Different levels of participation in corporate political strategies: Collective versus individual action.

摘要

Corporate political strategy formulation requires firms to make choices based on a complex set of decisions. One of these decisions in the process of political strategy formulation is to choose participation level. This study investigates how firms make participation choices between collective and individual action in the political strategy formulation process. Specifically, this research explores the effects of industry concentration, seeking import protection and having government contracts on firms' participation levels. This study also examines the moderating effects of import protection and government contracts on the relationship between industry concentration and level of participation.;The purpose of this dissertation is twofold; (1) to explore what factors affect firms' choices between collective and individual action, and (2) to introduce a contingency logic to the relationship between industry concentration and participation level. As this is a strategic decision for firms in the process of political strategy formulation, studying how firms decide between collective and individual action is of great importance to strategic management literature.;Hypotheses regarding different levels of participation in corporate political strategies are tested using a cross-sectional data on the electoral activities of 562 firms in the U.S. manufacturing industry over the period 1999-2002. The main findings of this dissertation are; (1) industry concentration, seeking import protection and having government contracts are important determinants of firms' participation levels, and (2) firms in highly concentrated industries do not always engage in collective action; however there are some contextual variables such as government contracts that lead to individual action.