America's first Cold War army: Combat readiness in the Eighth United States Army, 1949--1950.

摘要

This study of the Eighth U.S. Army's 1949--1950 combat training program argues that the generalizations regarding "occupation troops" used by historians and soldiers are simplistic. In point of fact they do little justice to the tens of thousands of soldiers and officers who did indeed seek to prepare themselves and their Army for war despite America's post-war atomic monopoly. The American soldiers sent to Korea in the summer of 1950 suffered from gaps in their professional preparation, from missing and broken equipment, and from unevenly trained leaders at every level of command. Nevertheless, they expected to defeat the Communist enemy. Their confidence resulted from many factors, not least of which was an appreciation of the skill and cohesion developed over the course of the previous twelve months---a year of progressive, focused, and iterative collective training based on the lessons of combat in World War II. No one was more surprised than they when the North Koreans not only didn't turn and run, but instead fought with courage and skill that required Herculean efforts to overcome. But because these American troops did not instantly stop the Red horde, their performance has become an indictment of the Eighth Army, and the U.S. Army as a whole, in the years 1945--1950. This judgment is based on a misguided and simplistic interpretation of events. The men of Task Force Smith and thousands like them in the understrength infantry regiments of Eighth Army achieved a signal strategic victory by preventing the Communists from completing their conquest of South Korea. This could not have been done had the men of the 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division not possessed a significant degree of familiarity with U.S. doctrine and tactics, a familiarity that could only have come from a well-planned and progressive training plan. Without doubt there were shortfalls in training, ammunition, vehicles and spare parts, weapons, and even clothing. But unlike American soldiers of previous wars, the men of 1950 found themselves hastily projected into what was later termed a "come-as-you-are" war. Denied the luxury of a months- or years-long mobilization and training period such as their fathers and older brothers experienced in 1917 and 1941, the soldiers of Eighth Army fought with the tools at hand, and won.; Acknowledgement of the Eighth Army's accomplishments in 1949 and early 1950 should facilitate a shift in the debate away from the lack of preparedness of "Occupation troops" and back onto a discussion of policy decisions made by the Truman Administration in the wake of World War II. These decisions required a much larger military than the President was willing to support. In another time and under other circumstances, an Army Chief of Staff warned of the dangers of embracing "a twelve-division strategy with a ten-division Army." Recognizing the significant constraints under which the Eighth Army operated in 1949 and 1950 will allow scholars and soldiers finally to discard what Douglas MacArthur called the "pernicious myth" of professional, physical and moral ineffectiveness that has heretofore prevented an honest discussion of Eighth Army's capabilities and limitations on the eve of war in 1950.