The Eighth Army's Combat Readiness Before Korea: A New Appraisal

摘要

The preceding narrative demonstrates that the Eighth Army experienced a paradigm shift in its basic responsibilities in 1949. The change of focus from constabulary functions to combat readiness reflected Army-wide trends, accelerated throughout 1949 and the first half of 1950, and culminated in large-scale maneuvers. Most long-service professionals had not seen such hectic activity since the days of American mobilization for World War II. Despite the myriad obstacles confronting Eighth Army units as they progressed toward the final goals, it is beyond dispute that those units did progress. The problem, which General Walker and his staff fully recognized, lay in the lack of uniformity with which elements advanced on the road to preparedness, as 2nd Battalion's example clearly shows. Eighth Army planners sought to limit the detrimental effects of the shallow military socialization of recruits during the eight-week basic training program provided by Army Field Forces until late 1949. In essence, Eighth Army unilaterally assumed responsibility for the transformation of its personnel from civilians to soldiers. The 13-week program tripled the amount of time trainees spent living in field conditions, doubled the attention given to marksmanship and physical conditioning, and added other elements completely lacking in the eight-week cycle. Walker's decision proved a godsend to readiness-minded leaders. Putting everyone "on the same sheet of music" allowed unit commanders to establish and enforce standards of discipline and training proficiency unrealizable in earlier years. That some commanders at every level accomplished this less well than others should surprise no one. Just as unsurprisingly, many battalions and some regiments, such as the 27th Infantry, became cohesive and competent teams, well-drilled in the basics of warfighting by the end of 1949, and fully prepared to amplify their collective proficiency in 1950. Moreover, the intensity of the year-long training program belies statements depicting life in Occupied Japan as an extended holiday for the infantry divisions. Just since 1 January 1950, the 27th Infantry's two battalions spent a total of 53 and 66 days respectively on collective training away from Camp Sakai, in addition to marksmanship and squad and crew level training conducted at their home station throughout the period. Extended periods of field training in all weather―including the notoriously cold training area at Fuji-Susono―would have done much to dispel expectations of a life of ease in any recruit's mind.