Formal Institution, Informal Institution and Institutionalization of Public Administration A Case Study of Chinese Land Administration.

摘要

The questions to be interpreted in this dissertation are as follows: How is the status in quo of the institutionalization and performance of Chinese public administration at the local level under reform? Why in some field the formal law and institution often haven't been implemented fully? What are the factors affecting the institutionalization and performance of Chinese public administration? What roles do the formal and informal institutions play? Why do the organizational informal rules exist in Chinese public administration popularly? This dissertation will supply a new evaluation and analysis of the institutionalization and performance of Chinese local governments through a case study on local administration.;The existing researches always take the low institutionalization and low performance of Chinese governance as the function of such factors as rationalization of Weberian bureaucracy, structure and function of governance, political system, and so on. And raise hypotheses on Chinese governance form basing on the above knowledge. This dissertation will interpret the operation of local public administration from "organizational informal institutions", and supply a new interpretative perspective other than the current studies for the institutionalization, performance and their causes on Chinese public administration.;The conclusions of this dissertation are as follows. The institutionalization of public administration in China have not achieved an ideal level no matter examining from the formulation of institution, the recognition and implementation of institution or the performance of administration and the penalty of the anti-institutional behavior. The main reason lead to this situation is that the local administration actors will develop informal institutions (rules) for the sake of protecting their own interests or accomplishing the task from above during administration and policy implementation under current institutional settings. These organizational informal institutions (rules) influence the implementation of formal institution and lead to the low performance and low institutionalization of public administration in the whole while they help to achieve local interests and temporary administration objects.;The new institutionalism literature considers the informal institutions as spontaneous, scattered, and unwritten ones and supposes their effects were just one-fold and one-shot. The findings of this article show that the popular, isomorphic informal rules in Chinese local administration are organizational even written ones. Theft effects upon formal institutions are not just one-fold and one-shot but complex and variable. These findings give some amendment or complement to the new institutionalism on the role of the informal institutions.;This dissertation also discusses systematically the factors lead to the informal institutions from the interest structure, property right, and integrated institutional arrangement and analyses the social effects of the organizational informal institutions. It has also summarized theoretically and systematically the informal institutions (rules) lying in Chinese local land administration for the first time and given a deep interpretation on the bad performance of the macro- regulation and control of real estate market. The approaches to reform land administration and improve the regulation of real estate market in China have also been discussed.;Key Words: Formal Institution, Organizational Informal Institution, Institutionalisation of Public Administration, Chinese Land Administration, New Institutionalism.