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Observing norms: Explaining the causes and consequences of internationally monitored elections.

机译:遵守规范:说明受国际监督的选举的成因和后果。

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摘要

This dissertation is motivated by the empirical puzzle that a substantial portion of leaders invite international election observers and then orchestrate massive electoral fraud. My argument is that election observation began as a signal to the international community that the incumbent leader was committed to democratizing. During the Cold War, leaders committed to democratization invited international observers in order to distinguish themselves from other leaders and curry favor with Western-oriented states. As international benefits for democratizing states increased, the act of inviting observers was imitated by leaders who wanted the benefits of looking like a committed democrat without actually becoming one. I provide a formal model of the decision by incumbent leaders to invite international election observers. I also provide a general model of international benefit allocation, and show how the goal of democracy promotion is related to other goals of foreign policy. The formal model yields propositions that I test with several original large-N datasets. I show that election observation grew as the benefits of being perceived as a legitimate democracy increased, and as leaders grew more skilled at manipulating the election without being detected.; The growth of international election observation also carried domestic consequences. The empirical evidence presented in the later part of this dissertation demonstrates how this change in international politics influenced domestic politics in states that invite observers. First, I demonstrate that observers can reduce election day fraud. This causal claim is supported empirically with natural experimental evidence. A second effect of the spread of election observation is that improvements in certain leaders' ability to manipulate the election led to observable changes in opposition party behavior. Because leaders were more likely to invite observers as they improved their ability to manipulate the election undetected, opposition parties responded by boycotting elections more frequently when international observers were present. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:本文的研究动机是,大量的领导人邀请国际选举观察员,然后策划大规模的选举舞弊,这是一个经验难题。我的论点是,选举观察开始向国际社会发出信号,表明现任领导人致力于民主化。在冷战期间,致力于民主化的领导人邀请了国际观察员,以与其他领导人区分开来,并与西方国家结盟。随着使国家民主化的国际利益的增加,邀请观察员的行为受到领导人的模仿,他们希望获得看起来像一个坚定的民主人士而实际上没有成为一个民主人士的好处。我提供了现任领导人邀请国际选举观察员的决定的正式模式。我还提供了国际利益分配的一般模型,并展示了民主促进的目标与外交政策的其他目标之间的关系。形式模型得出的命题,我用几个原始的大N数据集进行了测试。我表明,随着被视为合法民主国家的好处的增加,以及随着领导人越来越熟练地操纵选举而不被察觉,选举观察也随之增加。国际选举观察的增长也带来了国内后果。本文后面部分提供的经验证据表明,国际政治的这种变化是如何在邀请观察员的国家中影响国内政治的。首先,我证明观察员可以减少选举日舞弊。这种因果关系的主张在经验上得到了自然实验证据的支持。选举观察的传播的第二个效果是,某些领导人操纵选举能力的提高导致了反对党行为的明显变化。由于领导人更有可能邀请观察员,因为他们提高了不被发现的操纵选举的能力,因此,当国际观察员在场时,反对党的反应是更频繁地抵制选举。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)

著录项

  • 作者

    Hyde, Susan Dayton.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, San Diego.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, San Diego.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 290 p.
  • 总页数 290
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论 ; 国际法 ;
  • 关键词

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