This dissertation addresses the long-term planning of power generation and transmission facilities in a deregulated power market. Three models with increasing complexities are developed, primarily for investment decisions in generation and transmission capacity. The models are presented in a two-stage decision context where generation and transmission capacity expansion decisions are made in the first stage, while power generation and transmission service fees are decided in the second stage. Uncertainties that exist in the second stage affect the capacity expansion decisions in the first stage. The first model assumes that the electric power market is not constrained by transmission capacity limit. The second model, which includes transmission constraints, considers the interactions between generation firms and the transmission network operator. The third model assumes that the generation and transmission sectors make capacity investment decisions separately. These models result in Nash-Cournot equilibrium among the unregulated generation firms, while the regulated transmission network operator supports the competition among generation firms. Several issues in the deregulated electric power market can be studied with these models such as market powers of generation firms and transmission network operator, uncertainties of the future market, and interactions between the generation and transmission sectors. Results deduced from the developed models include (a) regulated transmission network operator will not reserve transmission capacity to gain extra profits; instead, it will make capacity expansion decisions to support the competition in the generation sector; (b) generation firms will provide more power supplies when there is more demand; (c) in the presence of future uncertainties, the generation firms will add more generation capacity if the demand in the future power market is expected to be higher; and (d) the transmission capacity invested by the transmission network operator depends on the characteristic of the power market and the topology of the transmission network. Also, the second model, which considers interactions between generation and transmission sectors, yields higher social welfare in the electric power market, than the third model where generation firms and transmission network operator make investment decisions separately.
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