The Bounded Rational Game under Governmental Predominance for MBO of the State-owned Enterprises

摘要

In the progress of MBO of the state-owned enterprises, there are three main targets: to reform the property system, to withdraw state-owned capital, and to activate the management. MBO under governmental predominance is a process that involves interest redistribution among the government, the enterprises, the strategic investor, and the buy-out management. This paper, at the angle of bounded rationality, builds up the replicate dynamics model of the asymmetrical game between the strategic investor and the buy-out management, and the evolution game between the government and the buy-out management in the progress of MBO; and analyzes the bounded rationality of the government, and elements of conditionality in such a process. It then points out that it is a wise choice for the government to select a flexible and dynamic reforming target, and arrange a transitional system aiming at bounded rationality. In the end, the paper gives some policy suggestions on promoting MBO.